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1. Introduction
This paper evaluates what we have learned about
the relevance and reliability of financial and non-
financial information on intangibles from the
value-relevance literature. The paper provides a
rather wide-ranging view across the literatures in
several disciplines, including economics, account-
ing, and management. This approach is motivated
by the difficulty of testing for reliability using the
value-relevance design. Since the reliability of in-
formation on intangibles for valuation is an issue
of central interest, this paper provides an indirect,
second-order assessment of reliability by piecing
together the evidence from a large number of
studies with different research questions and de-
signs, and different measures of intangibles infor-
mation and value.
Information is value-relevant when it is associ-
ated with investors’ valuation of the firm as re-
flected in the firm’s stock price. However, intan-
gibles are generally unverifiable and uncertain by
nature. Regulators and some researchers therefore
hold reservations about financial disclosures on
intangibles, including the costs and benefits to the
firms, and the reliability for investors.1 Value-rel-
evance studies provide some insights on these
concerns. If the information items of interest are
significantly associated with the information set
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Abstract—This paper evaluates what we have learned about the relevance and reliability of financial and non-fi-
nancial information on intangibles from the value-relevance literature. Because value-relevance studies do not eas-
ily allow judgments about the reliability of information on intangibles, and this is an issue of central interest, this
paper takes a rather wide look across a range of literatures to try to piece together some indirect evidence on both
relevance and reliability. The evidence from a package of value-relevance and triangulation studies suggests re-
search and development (R&D) is generally not reliably measured and may be less relevant in some contexts than
others as well (e.g. established versus growth firms). Further purchased goodwill and some non-financial measures
of brands and customer loyalty do not appear to be reliably measured. While a large number of financial and non-
financial information is value-relevant, it is difficult to make categorical judgments about most other items, as dif-
ferences in value-relevance could be due to different relevance or reliability, or both. Several rich areas for future
research include designing direct tests of reliability, focusing on settings where intangibles are changing due to
shocks, finding new economic benchmarks to test reliability, and studying the impact of accounting discretion and
factors such as strategy and capabilities on value-relevance tests of information on intangibles. Two regulatory is-
sues arising from this review paper are the gap in the reporting of separate line items of expenditures on intangi-
bles; and the possibility that giving management discretion, with regulatory guidance, to report intangibles might
facilitate more value-relevant information on intangibles.
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1 For example, the Financial Accounting Standards
Committee of the American Accounting Association com-
mented on the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s
‘Proposal for a New Agenda Project: Disclosure of
Information about Intangible Assets Not Recognized in
Financial Statements, August 17’, September 28, 2001: ‘If the
FASB is to step in and (say) mandate the disclosure of certain
information on intangibles, a question that seems relevant is:
why have firms chosen not to disclose this information volun-
tarily. One answer is that there are likely to be costs associat-
ed with such disclosures, including both costs associated with
measuring intangibles and proprietary costs of disclosing such
information to competitors. Another answer may be that the
benefits of these disclosures are not very large, perhaps be-
cause these disclosures are not very informative to investors
due to low relevance or imprecise measurement. Whatever the
case, it seems to us that the relatively low levels of voluntary
disclosure in the intangibles area raise the possibility that dis-
closures in this area do not provide net benefits.’
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that was used by investors to value the company,
we can infer that the information is relevant (ei-
ther directly or indirectly in a confirmative sense)
for valuing the company. This statistical associa-
tion with stock price also suggests that the infor-
mation is reliable enough to be value-relevant.
However, there are limits to what can be learned
about reliability. Conclusions from value-rele-
vance studies are not reliable if important factors
are left out of the tests. We cannot tell whether in-
vestors actually used the information item of in-
terest or whether one accounting method is
optimal relative to another, or easily understand
why information is value-relevant. Overall, it is
difficult to directly test reliability and only a few
studies do this.
Intangible investment is increasingly viewed by
some as an important category of investment.2
This view reflects an increasing tendency for
technology to be embodied in intellectual proper-
ty (IP) and labour where previously it resided in
fixed assets. Without a long and comprehensive
financial data series, however, it has proved im-
possible to conclusively test this hypothesis. At a
more fundamental level, it is easy to argue that ex-
penditures on intangibles are important because
the stock of physical resources is finite and eco-
nomic activity can only be sustained by the appli-
cation of intellectual inputs (Webster, 1999). This
presents a prima facie case for the value-rele-
vance of at least some of the firm’s expenditures
on intangibles and the non-financial information
bearing on the value and uncertainty associated
with these expenditures.
Intangibles are also at the centre of an informa-
tion gap that arises from the forward looking and
uncertain nature of economic activity. In fact, all
of the firm’s investments, tangible and intangible,
are uncertain by definition, since investment ex-
penditures are outlays made in anticipation of fu-
ture benefits (Fisher, 1930). However, while
tangible assets tend to be standardised with control
rights and a predictable stream of inflows, intangi-
ble assets tend to be heterogeneous and uncertain
and subject to long development periods without
control rights (Webster, 1999). This uncertainty
engages managers and investors in a constant
search for information to improve their foresight
and decisions. Management have a central role in
generating estimates of the future as they design
and execute their firm’s strategy (Knight 1921,
Part III). These estimates embody a range of ex-
pectations about investor and consumer behav-
iours and wider economic conditions; and they are
partially (and imperfectly) revealed in Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) financial
reports and the firm’s interactions with the busi-
ness environment.
In this paper, the literature is organised into six
categories of intangibles that relate to the firms’
core value drivers and five different measurement
approaches that reflect the influence of GAAP, re-
searcher defined intangibles and non-financial
input and output metrics. The review in this paper
indicates that expenditures on R&D are value-rel-
evant but appear to be less reliable than tangible
items and to vary in the ability to signal future ben-
efits. Purchased goodwill and some non-financial
measures of brands and customer satisfaction are
usually value-relevant but do not appear to be reli-
able indicators of future benefits. A wide variety of
other financial and non-financial information on
intangibles is value-relevant. However it is diffi-
cult to know whether variation in the size of the re-
gression coefficient is due to differences in
relevance or reliability, or both. Overall, it is diffi-
cult to obtain robust tests of reliability and ad-
dressing this gap is a key area for future research.
One gap in financial information that is evident
from the review in this paper is the reporting of
separate line items of expenditures on intangibles
in the income statement. It is often argued that
value creation is reflected in earnings. However,
earnings are a summary number that is not neces-
sarily useful for addressing the question of how
value is created. For this purpose, information
about value driving expenditures is relevant. There
is also evidence that accounting regulators might
better facilitate value-relevant disclosures on in-
tangibles if they give discretion to management to
report their firm’s economic reality.
Section 2 begins with some background on the
classification and economic properties of intangi-
bles. Section 3 provides an overview of studies
that examine the value-relevance of financial and
non-financial information relating to intangibles.
These sections consider how we might interpret
this evidence in the light of wider economic con-
ditions and other factors, such as omitted variables
relating to the firm’s competencies and strategy.
Section 4 concludes with a discussion of what we
have learned from the value-relevance tests, along
with research design issues and some directions
for future research.
2. Background
This section outlines the categories of intangibles
used to structure the review in this paper, the eco-
nomic properties of investments in intangibles, and
the design of value-relevance studies, including a
discussion of the concepts of relevance and relia-
218 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
2 This trend has been ascribed to authors including the follow-
ing (see Webster 1999): Kendrick (1972), Caves and Murphy
(1976), Magee (1977), Grabowski and Mueller (1978), Reekie and
Bhoyrub (1981), Rugman (1981), Hirschey (1982), Caves (1982),
Cantwell (1989), and Abramovitz (1993).
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bility, which are the focal point of the value-rele-
vance literature.
2.1. Classification of intangibles
The literature review in this paper canvasses 
a broad range of studies from the accounting, 
economic and management literatures. Papers in-
cluded in the study are not exhaustive but are rep-
resentative of the research questions and research
designs observed in the different areas of study.
The papers are classified according to six cate-
gories of intangibles as follows:
Technology resources
1. R&D expenditures and related IP
Human resources
2. Human capital
Production resources
3. Advertising, brands and related IP
4. Customer loyalty
5. Competitive advantage
6. Goodwill
These six categories of intangibles relate to
three broad categories of the firm’s resources:
technology, human, and production resources.3
Category one, R&D expenditures and the IP off-
shoots, such as patents, are aimed at developing
technology, which is defined as a body of knowl-
edge about how to do or make something
(Metcalfe, 1998). Category two, human capital,
relates to the resource generated by investing in
employees. Categories three–six (advertising,
brands and related IP; customer loyalty; competi-
tive advantage; and goodwill), relate to produc-
tion resources the firm has generated or acquired
from prior periods’ intangible investments. These
six categories overlap, but, in the big-picture
view, relate to the three broader elements of the
firm’s activities and resources, as outlined above.
The six categories of intangibles are not exhaus-
tive. Arguments can be made that other categories,
such as environmental and social responsibility,
are also important. The rationale for what is in-
cluded is the need to be selective given the large
numbers of papers but at the same time provide an
accurate account of the types of information that
researchers have studied.
These six categories of intangibles are further par-
titioned according to five measurement categories.
1. Management reported assets (financial measures);
2. Researcher estimated assets (financial measures
or non-financial metrics);
3. Annual expenditures (financial measures);
4. Input metrics (e.g. non-financial metrics, such
as the number of scientists);
5. Output metrics (e.g. non-financial metrics, such
as the number of patents).
The measurement categories reflect (1) the eco-
nomics of the value creation processes and the 
researchers and practitioners’ interests in the iden-
tification of value drivers and their empirical
measures; (2) the influence of GAAP on the re-
porting of intangibles and the research problems of
interest to practitioners and researchers; and (3)
the influence of management discretion.
Annual expenditures and management reported
assets
The logical starting point for researchers and in-
vestors is to identify how much has been spent on
intangibles and the types of activities and rents in-
volved. Once this information is known, rates of
return from different types of expenditures can be
computed, illuminating some of the drivers of firm
performance.
However, this financial data is not available
under current GAAP. Further, the factors that
cause expenditures to give rise to future rents are
not fully understood and change over time. In ad-
dition, management do not necessarily think in
terms of ‘intangibles’ and do not always have in-
centives to voluntarily provide expenditures data
of this type (e.g. for competitive reasons). Line
item disclosures of expenditures on intangibles are
therefore primarily limited to R&D with some re-
search on advertising and labour costs where pos-
sible (e.g. advertising costs have not been
available in the UK and are only patchily disclosed
in the US). Hence, the research able to be under-
taken on annual expenditures on intangibles is
limited to a narrow range of expenditures.
Management reported assets are also limited
under GAAP due to regulators’ concerns about the
reliability and verifiability of these items.4 The rel-
evance of the information for evaluating perform-
ance and value is seldom disputed. Reliability is
the regulator’s concern: does the recorded number
reflect expected future benefits and what is the
probability these expected benefits are realisable?
As a result of these concerns, GAAP is conserva-
tive. This conservatism manifests as a two-way
classification, acquired assets and internal 
Vol. 38 No. 3 2008 International Accounting Policy Forum. 219
3 Researchers have come up with a variety of classifications
of intangibles which are often bundled under the label of ‘in-
tangible capital’. See, for example, Abernathy and Clarke
(1985), Webster (1999), Commission of the European
Communities (2003), Ashton (2005), and Hunter, Webster and
Wyatt (2005).
4 Relevant information has predictive value and/or confir-
matory value, and therefore has the ability to influence the
economic decisions of users and is provided in time to influ-
ence those decisions. Reliable information is free from delib-
erate bias and material error and is complete. If information is
reliable then GAAP maintains that it can be depended on to
faithfully represent what it purports to represent or could rea-
sonably be expected to represent.
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expenditures, from which only the acquired intan-
gibles can usually be recorded as assets.5 This lim-
its the research able to be undertaken on internally
generated intangible assets. There are insights
available on the value-relevance of management
reported assets of both types (acquired and inter-
nal) from settings and time periods where GAAP
allowed more liberal reporting of intangible assets
(e.g. Australia, prior to the 2005 adoption of inter-
national accounting standards, or Ely and Waymire
(1999), who study New York Stock Exchange list-
ed companies allowed to report intangibles in the
1927 pre-SEC era).
Researcher estimated assets, and input and output
metrics
Due to gaps in financial reporting under GAAP,
to attempt the difficult task of studying optimal ac-
counting methods, or to study the value drivers,
some financial and non-financial measures of in-
tangibles have to be estimated by the researchers
themselves (e.g. the construction of R&D assets
from R&D expenditures in Lev and Sougiannis,
1996. or the managerial skills measure in Abdel-
khalik, 2003). Researchers studying value creation
processes also focus on input or output metrics
such as the number of scientists associated with
the company (input metric: see Darby, Liu and
Zucker, 1999) or patent metrics as a measure of
technological innovation (output metric: see Hall,
Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2005).
In summary, Table 1 in the appendix summaris-
es the literature using the six intangibles categories
and five measurement classifications. The studies
are also grouped on the value-relevance measure
employed by the researcher: stock price levels,
stock returns or financial performance measures.
Percentages of firms with significant coefficients
for the financial or non-financial information on
intangibles and coefficients that are smaller than
those on other tangible assets in the test (as only a
rough guide to reliability) are provided in the body
of the table.
We now briefly look at the economics of intan-
gibles in the next section to get a feel for the prop-
erties that impact the relevance and reliability of
information relating to intangibles.
2.2. Economic properties of intangibles
Expenditures on intangibles are usually invest-
ments since they are made in anticipation of future
benefits (Fisher, 1930). Expenditures such as R&D
and advertising may be employed directly in pro-
duction to generate innovations and product mar-
ket share. In addition, these expenditures can also
give rise to intermediate (produced) assets, which
are used in production. For example, intellectual
property (IP) outputs are used in production to
generate future rents in various ways, such as
through the ability to charge a price premium or
control costs. R&D and advertising can generate
patents, trademarks, brands or designs that provide
property rights over innovations or generate mar-
ket share and thereby permit the firm to appropri-
ate the expected benefits from the earlier R&D and
advertising investments.
There are complex lead-lag relations between
early investments, intermediate (produced) assets,
capital investments to produce the goods, and fu-
ture expected benefits that are challenging for re-
searchers to observe and model. Successful
investments generate a range of intangible assets
and future rents for the firm right across the value
chain. But not all of the firm’s outlays are success-
ful in creating value.
From the investors’ perspective, stock price re-
flects the capital market’s expectation of the firm’s
future cash flows from the firm’s investments.
Investor expectations are formulated from a di-
verse set of information. This information set pres-
ents some problems for investors and managers.
Chief among these is the fact that this set can never
be complete because the future is uncertain.6 The
available information is imperfect and not held as
a complete unit. Instead, the information exists as
‘dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently con-
tradictory knowledge’ in the hands of individuals
(Hayek, 1945: 519).
‘At the bottom of the uncertainty problem in
economics is the forward-looking character of
the economic process itself. Goods are produced
to satisfy wants; the production of goods re-
quires time, and two elements of uncertainty are
220 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
5 Under the previous UK standard, FRS 10 Goodwill and
Intangible Assets, which is now superseded by IFRS 3
Business Combinations, intangible assets are non-financial
fixed assets that do not have physical substance but are iden-
tifiable and are controlled by the entity through custody or
legal rights (para. 20). Internally developed intangible assets
can be capitalised if there is control and a readily ascertaina-
ble market value. According to FRS 10, ‘readily ascertainable
market value’ is the ‘value of an intangible asset that is estab-
lished by reference to a market with a homogenous population
of assets and the market is active as evidenced by frequent
trades for that population of assets.’ Since active markets of
this type generally do not exist for intangibles, only acquired
intangibles can be routinely capitalised. SSAP 13 Accounting
for Research and Development allows capitalisation of devel-
opment costs only if future benefits are virtually certain. The
International Accounting Standards Board in IAS 38
Intangible Assets has asymmetric rules for acquired intangi-
bles and internal expenditures on intangibles. Under IAS 38,
there is a presumption that acquired intangible assets are
measured reliably and are therefore capitalisable assets.
However, to be treated as assets, internal expenditures on in-
tangibles must pass six additional tests as set out in IAS 38
paragraph 57.
6 Shackle (1974: 3) points out that managers do not actual-
ly know their circumstances in the sense of having complete or
perfect information; there is a ‘… lack of knowledge, unlike
actuarial probability calculations which require substantial
knowledge’ (Shackle as cited in Ford (1994: 82); see Knight,
1921).
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introduced, corresponding to two different kinds
of foresight which must be exercised: First, the
end of productive operations must be estimated
from the beginning. It is notoriously impossible
to tell accurately when entering upon productive
activity what will be its results in physical terms,
what (a) quantities and (b) qualities of goods
will result from the expenditure of given re-
sources. Second, the wants which the goods are
to satisfy are also, of course, in the future to the
same extent, and their prediction involves uncer-
tainty in the same way. The producer, then, must
estimate (1) the future demand which he is striv-
ing to satisfy and (2) the future results of his op-
erations in attempting to satisfy that demand.’
Knight (1921, III.VIII.8)
The extent of the problem for managers depends
on factors such as the technical difficulty of the
firm’s products and processes, the extent to which
the firm’s assets and routines are standardised and
predictable versus non-standard and unpredictable,
and the strength of property rights (Dosi, 1988).
Investors have the problem of decision making
under uncertainty, which is compounded by infor-
mation asymmetry between managers and in-
vestors, and among investors themselves. Investors
also have different levels of sophistication and in-
centives to search for value-relevant information.
Some investors are therefore more informed than
others. These information asymmetries are exacer-
bated by the natural optimism of managers about
their firm’s prospects.
What economists have learned about production
and growth is important for value-relevance studies
because information is value-relevant only if it is
capable of reflecting some aspect of the firm’s eco-
nomics. For example, we expect expenditures on
training to be value-relevant if the expenditures are
associated with increases in the skills and produc-
tivity of employees. Economists find that expendi-
tures on intangibles are important for building the
firm’s capabilities to exploit emerging opportunities
and meet profitability goals (Cohen and Levinthal,
1989).7 These expenditures help to differentiate the
firm’s value creating activities and routines so they
are hard for rivals to copy and help reduce the num-
ber of uncontrolled factors impacting the firm’s op-
erations (Webster, 1999). As a result, intangibles
are contingent by nature and intrinsically exposed
to economic states. For example, the benefits from
training staff are contingent on the state of the
labour market as well as the firm’s own ability to at-
tract, retain and motivate the employees.
Expenditures on intangibles are distinguished
from tangible investments based on the heteroge-
neous and non-standardised nature of intangible
investments (Webster, 1999). Heterogeneity and
standardisation are a function of how often tasks
have been performed before and the ease of copy-
ing. Plant, property and equipment are relatively
standardised compared with payments for intellec-
tual inputs from employees and payments for pro-
duced intangible assets from outside the firm. The
outputs produced from the intellectual inputs of
employees, and intangible assets purchased from
outside the firm, are more difficult to control and
predict compared with the outputs from machines
(Webster, 1999).
A further source of uncertainty is the inability to
assign property rights over people and over some
types of assets (e.g. R&D). The value is often tied
up with people who cannot be owned or attributa-
ble to rents that are easily dissipated by rival firms
(e.g. brands) (Webster, 1999). Property rights over
intangible investment may be unavailable for ex-
tended periods while a project is developed. By
contrast, investment in tangible assets occurs when
the company is ready to produce products.
In summary, the economic properties of intangi-
bles reflect several fundamental uncertainties, in-
cluding an intrinsic exposure to changing
economic states, an unstandardised and heteroge-
neous nature, and difficulty obtaining property
rights. Expenditures on intangibles are therefore
less reliable by definition compared with tangible
assets. Accordingly, while financial information
on intangibles is likely to be relevant for valuing
the firm, it is less likely to be reliable, especially in
the earlier stages of the investment. Non-financial
information is likely to be value-relevant if it is
sufficiently salient to the firm’s economic reality
and precisely measured to be informative about the
earnings effects of the firm’s interaction with its
environment.
2.3. Relevance, reliability and value-relevance
tests
value-relevance studies test for an association
between information items of interest and a stock
price or financial measure of value, for example,
the market value of equity, stock returns or 
future earnings. The tests rely on stock market 
efficiency.8
Vol. 38 No. 3 2008 International Accounting Policy Forum. 221
7 The intangible investment is not confined to R&D but in-
volves a bundle of expenditures and activities of different
types, including strategic planning, design, feasibility, devel-
opment, production, marketing, distribution, advertising, cus-
tomer service, management of intellectual property portfolios,
and building of organisation and information infrastructures
and routines (Abernathy and Clark, 1985).
8 The assumptions include (see Lev and Ohlson, 1989:
297–298): prices in the pre-disclosure economy are unbiased
estimators of the prices in the post-disclosure economy; indi-
viduals have homogeneous information and identical beliefs
about the implications of the intangibles information; and the
economy is efficient in the sense that more information is
(Pareto) better than less information so that nobody is worse
off while additional trading on the information would make
some better off.
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The regressions used for value-relevance tests
associate the value-relevance measure on the left-
hand side of the equation with the information
items of interest and other variables on the right-
hand side of the equation.
Market value of equity = (1)
b0 + b1Book value of equity + 
b2Earnings + 
b3Information of interest + error
Stock return = (2)
b0 + b1Earnings +
b2Change in Earnings + 
b3Information of interest + error
Financial performance = (3)
b0 + b1X +
b2Information of interest + error
The existence of a statistical association is deter-
mined by looking at the estimated regression coef-
ficients, the ‘b’s in equations (1)–(3) and testing
whether they are significantly different from what
was expected. If the test statistic is significant, we
can infer that the information of interest is associ-
ated with the value-relevance measure on the left-
hand side.
2.3.1. What can be inferred?
We can infer that the information item of interest
is associated with the information set that investors
used to value the firm’s equity, and the information
item is therefore value-relevant. But there are at
least two things we cannot infer. First, we cannot
infer that investors actually used the information
of interest to value the firm. Second, we cannot
infer from the statistical test alone that the infor-
mation of interest causes the level of market value,
changes in stock price, or financial performance.
The statistical test only tells us whether the value-
relevance measure and the information of interest
are statistically associated.
It is also difficult to infer optimal accounting
policies from value-relevance tests. Holthausen
and Watts (2001) argue this is because value-rele-
vance tests provide a statistical association that is
not backed up by theory and modelling of the un-
derlying links between accounting, standard set-
ting and value.
A factor adversely impacting the inferences
available from value-relevance studies is the prob-
lem of omitted correlated variables. That is, factors
of varying importance that are associated with the
left- and right-hand side variables are not included
in the equation. For example, Holthausen and
Watts (2001) point out that expected future rents
are omitted from value-relevance regressions.
Omissions like this can distort the ‘b’ coefficients
in equations (1)–(3) and lead to erroneous conclu-
sions. One common problem is the effect of differ-
ences in firm size on the test results. Size differ-
ences can produce significant results that have lit-
tle to do with the intrinsic attributes of the item of
interest. For example, a significant test for the ‘b’
coefficient on goodwill might just show that large
companies have more goodwill.
There are also trade-offs in the choice of the
value-relevance measure. Shevlin (1996) points out
that, for investment variables, the sign is more in-
tuitive in the stock levels regression compared with
the stock returns model. That is, an unexpected
change in investment can be good or bad news, but
a significant association for the total amount of the
investment (e.g. R&D expenditures) is expected to
be positively related to value-relevance metrics.
Further, there may be little change in the variable of
interest in a narrow return interval (e.g. change in
stock price over a quarter or a year). For example,
customer satisfaction for an established brand com-
pany such as Coca-Cola might be highly value-rel-
evant in a stock price levels regression but the
value might change very little on an annual basis.
Finally, financial measures are limited to the extent
that they do not reflect the capitalised value of the
expected benefits from intangible assets. We need
to consider the impact of these trade-offs in draw-
ing conclusions from value-relevance studies.
2.3.2. Concepts of relevance and reliability in
value-relevance studies
Value-relevance tests are joint tests of relevance
and reliability (e.g. Barth et al., 2001). However, it
is difficult to infer the amount of ‘value-relevance’
that is due to relevance and the amount that is due
to reliability.
Figure 1 graphically depicts the relevance and
reliability concepts. Conceptually, relevance re-
lates to two aspects of the underlying economics of
the investment. The first is a value construct of
some kind, such as expenditures on R&D or ac-
quisition of goodwill. The second is the process by
which value is expected to be created (e.g. the
R&D is expected to produce value by generating a
new large pharmaceutical molecule to be used in a
drug with a known purpose). Relevance of infor-
mation is decreasing to the extent that the value
creation process is ill-defined. An example is pur-
chased goodwill, which is a residual from a com-
mercial transaction that relates to an unspecified
value creation process. When the relevance link is
weak (as defined in terms of an ill-defined value
creation process), such as in the case of purchased
goodwill, then the next link in the value-relevance
chain, the reliability link, is also going to be weak.
This way of thinking benchmarks reliability
against the uncertainty of the value creation
process. That is, it is going to be difficult to meas-
ure something that defies definition in terms of
how the value is going to be created.
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In Figure 1, a reliable measure is capable of con-
veying information about the future benefits ex-
pected to flow from an underlying investment.
Usually, the measure relates to a quantum of ex-
penditure, but the measure can (less commonly) be
a revaluation amount. Reliability refers to two
links. The first is the relevance link. For reliable
measurement, there must be a reasonably well de-
fined value construct link to a known value cre-
ation process. Second, a measure is required that is
capable of reflecting the economic substance of
the value construct and process. An example of a
measure that falls down at the reliable measure-
ment stage is R&D expenditures. Specifically, the
individual firm aggregates various types of expen-
ditures into their R&D measure and has a good
idea of the value creation process. However, for
external parties to the firm, the R&D expenditures
number reported in the income statement are too
general to convey highly reliable information to
investors about value creation and expected bene-
fits. This is because the R&D aggregates expendi-
tures relating to different kinds of undisclosed
value constructs and value creation activities, not
all of which are going to lead to expected future
benefits. Hence, conceptually, the R&D expendi-
tures provide relevant information about value cre-
ation, but the measure is not a reliable indicator of
future rents.
Reliability is affected by a number of factors.
One is GAAP rules. For example, as discussed, the
aggregate nature and full expensing of R&D ex-
penditures adversely impacts the reliability of the
R&D measure. A second factor is economic un-
certainty, which adversely impacts reliability if it
causes the link from the value construct to value
creation to be ill-defined (e.g. there is uncertainty
about how basic research will generate value)
and/or generates uncertainty about the probability
of future benefits. Reliability is also affected by a
third factor, management discretion. The effect is
positive if management have incentives to com-
municate credibly with investors and potentially
negative if management’s interests are not aligned
with shareholders’ interests.
To distinguish relevance and reliability effects in
value-relevance studies, and to obtain a direct test
of reliability, it is necessary to develop the rele-
vance and reliability links in setting up the study.
This is a difficult task. One of the few studies that
do this is Healy, Myers and Howe (2002). They
simulate financial accounting data for a sample of
500 pharmaceutical companies. Simulation en-
sures that the value creation process, the R&D ex-
penditures, and the firm value are known. As a
result, Healy et al. (2002) are able to examine the
value-relevance of R&D accounted for in different
ways under GAAP, as well as the effects of eco-
nomic uncertainty and management discretion.
Another way to think about reliability is to com-
pare the regression coefficient for the intangible
item with the size of the coefficient for more reli-
able assets. As a rough guide, we expect more re-
liable information to have a larger coefficient.
However, this comparison is difficult because size
difference in the ‘b’ coefficients could be due to
differences in relevance or reliability, or both. Very
few of the value-relevance studies directly address
the question of reliability.
As a second-best alternative, we can get some
indirect insights by selecting a wide range across
the literature from different disciplines (e.g. eco-
nomics, accounting, management, and marketing)
to let the overlapping nature of the studies tell the
story. This is the approach taken in the review fol-
lowing in Section 3.
Vol. 38 No. 3 2008 International Accounting Policy Forum. 223
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3. What information on intangibles is
value-relevant?
Section 3 reviews a cross-section of the literature
organised according to the six categories of intan-
gibles: R&D and related IP; advertising, brands
and related IP; customer loyalty; human capital;
competitive advantage; and goodwill. Each cate-
gory of intangibles is reviewed according to the
five types of measures that were introduced in
Section 2.1.
3.1. R&D and related IP
This section considers R&D and its IP output,
mainly comprising patents. IP refers to the laws
governing creations of the mind, including inven-
tions, literary and artistic works, and symbols,
names, images, and designs used in commerce.
The two categories of IP are industrial property
(patents, trademarks, copyright, designs, circuit
layouts, and plant breeder’s rights) and copyright
(literary and artistic works, such as novels, poems
and plays, films, musical works, drawings, paint-
ings, photographs, sculptures, and architectural de-
signs).9 IP is designed to grant a short-term
monopoly so the entrepreneur can capture value
from their investments.10
Most research focuses on patents because
patents measure knowledge creation.
Expenditures on successful R&D give rise to
product and process innovations and a product
pipeline to ensure a sustainable earnings stream
into the future and value. R&D expenditures are
inputs that also give rise to IP outputs, which may
comprise patents, trademarks and designs. IP is
employed in production to produce goods and
services, help appropriate expected benefits due to
the short-term monopoly, and potentially support a
price premium.
3.1.1. R&D and IP – management reported assets
R&D and IP are important factors of production,
particularly for high-technology companies
(Griliches, 1990), but are not routinely capitalis-
able under GAAP in most countries (e.g. usually
expensed under IAS 38 Intangible Assets). On the
one hand, producing technology engages the firm
in relatively unstructured and uncertain problem-
solving activities (Dosi, 1988). Adopting technolo-
gy also engages firms in costly problem solving
and learning activities. The uncertainty associated
with R&D and the associated projects leads to full
expensing of R&D. Financial statements of R&D
intensive companies usually do not fully capture
the economics of these activities.
Consistent with this idea, Kwon (2001) finds
management reported GAAP numbers are less
value-relevant for high-technology firms than for
low-technology firms. His evidence suggests that
this difference is due to the greater impact of
GAAP accounting conservatism in high-technolo-
gy firms compared with low-technology firms.
Consistent with uncertainty about future eco-
nomic benefits, Wyatt (2005) finds that R&D as-
sets are not significantly associated with stock
returns in the Australian setting. This evidence is
from the time period prior to the 2005 adoption of
international financial reporting standards (IFRS)
in Australia. At that time, companies were allowed
to capitalise applied R&D expenditures, but it was
not mandatory. There was no accounting standard
for identifiable intangible assets at the time. As a
result, management had wide discretion to choose
not to record R&D assets and instead record a
wide array of other intangibles assets that are
much more informative about the value creation
process.11 In contrast to the lack of R&D asset
value-relevance, Wyatt finds that the identifiable
intangible assets are significantly positively relat-
ed to stock returns. Her evidence further suggests
that the identifiable intangible assets are signifi-
cantly associated with technological factors driv-
ing the firm’s production function. However, the
R&D assets are not. This finding suggests why the
R&D assets are not value-relevant.12
By contrast, Deng and Lev (1998) find R&D-in-
process assets purchased and valued as part of an
acquisition are value-relevant. They use a sample
of 400 companies acquiring R&D in-process as-
sets in the years 1985–1996. Both Wyatt (2005)
and Deng and Lev (1998) use contemporaneous
224 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
9 See http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/. Recent IP develop-
ments also include technological protection measures (TPM)
and digital rights management (DRM). TPMs are used in ma-
terial such as sound recordings, films and computer software,
as well as electronic artistic and literary works (e-books).
DRM is technology used to control access to digital works or
devices, to protect copyright in those works or the works used
on the devices. For example, the iTunes store incorporates
DRM into its music, to restrict copying. There is no known
evidence on the value-relevance of these IP.
10 IP is designed to ‘create a market for knowledge by as-
signing property rights to innovators which enable them to
overcome the problems of non-excludability while at the same
time, encouraging the maximum diffusion of knowledge by
making it public’ (Geroski, 1995: 97). See Griliches et al.
(1987); Trajtenberg (1990); Austin (1993); Hall et al. (2001).
11 To outsiders of the firm, R&D expenditures are a bundle
of unknown expenditures with unknown links to future bene-
fits. R&D assets are only marginally more defined: while cap-
italisation of assets is a signal of future benefits beyond the
current period, the aggregate nature of R&D precludes in-
vestors making precise links between the expenditures and
value creation in the absence of other information about the
firm’s R&D success rate.
12 Wyatt (2005) finds that management’s choice to record
intangible assets is associated with the strength of the technol-
ogy affecting the firm’s operations, the length of the technolo-
gy cycle time, and property rights-related factors that affect
the firm’s ability to appropriate the investment benefits. These
effects are more important than other contracting and sig-
nalling factors consistent with the underlying economics oper-
ating as a first-order effect as envisaged by GAAP.
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stock return as their value-relevance measure. The
main points of difference are the economic signif-
icance of the acquired R&D-in-process assets,
which represent an average 75% of the acquisition
cost. By contrast, the R&D assets reported by
Australian companies are internal expenditures
that comprise an average of 1% (median 0%) of
the firms’ total assets. Further, compared with the
US companies, the Australian companies had dis-
cretion to report more informative intangible as-
sets, reducing the need to communicate with
investors via the more uncertain R&D assets.
The US Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB) has required full expensing of R&D costs
since 1974 (Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 2). In a break from this strict stan-
dard, the FASB issued Statement of Financial
Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 86 Accounting
for the Costs of Computer Software to be Sold,
Leased, or Otherwise Marketed in August 1985,
which allows the capitalisation of software devel-
opment costs once technological feasibility of the
software is established. Givoly and Shi (2007) ex-
amine the capitalisation of software development
costs by IPO firms. They test and find capitalisa-
tion is associated with lower underpricing of the
stock on the first day of trading. They interpret this
as evidence that the capitalisers are subject to less
uncertainty about the success of their software in-
vestments but do not test whether these capitalised
costs and lower underpricing predict future per-
formance. An open question is whether capitalised
software is enough information to distinguish the
prospects of the newly listed software companies
that face significant technological and competitive
pressures in the industry, without the benefit of a
minimum efficient scale.
For a sample of computer programming and pre-
packaged software firms surviving for at least
three years, Aboody and Lev (1998) find the soft-
ware assets reported under SFAS No. 86 are value-
relevant. However, only 25% of the total software
development costs are capitalised by these firms.
Eccher (1998) suggests one explanation for this is
the working model approach to software develop-
ment where software is completed (technically
feasible) late in the development period, resulting
in few capitalisable costs. The firm’s software de-
velopment strategy therefore appears to be rele-
vant to a full interpretation of value-relevance tests
for software costs.
A further issue examined by Aboody and Lev
(1998) is the petition by The Software Publishers
Association in 1996 to abolish SFAS No. 86.
Aboody and Lev suggest this petition was moti-
vated by increasingly negative effects of the ac-
counting standard on earnings, in a maturing
industry. However, they also find higher analyst
earnings forecast errors for capitalisers compared
with expensers, which suggests there is some at-
tribute of the capitalising firms that makes their
earnings harder to predict compared with expens-
ing firms. Given there is more information in cap-
italised intangible assets for growth compared
with steady state firms, one possibility is the capi-
talisers are growth firms that are more risky than
the expensing firms.
Ken Wasch, president of The Software Publishers
Association, sheds some light on the risk issue. He
argues there is significant uncertainty even at the
point of technical feasibility about the success of
the software ‘due to factors such as the ever-in-
creasing volatility in the software marketplace, the
compression of product cycles, the heightened
level of competition and the divergence of tech-
nology platforms’ (Aboody and Lev, 1998: foot-
note 3).
Economic studies show these factors do impact
the firm’s success rate and performance (e.g.
Audretsch, 1995). For example, Agarwal and Gort
(2001) find the average cycle time from an idea to
a viable product has decreased from 33 years in
1900 to 3.4 years in 1967–1986. Further, as the
cycle time decreases, costs and the level of compe-
tition escalates (Scherer, 1966; Graves, 1989; Ittner
and Larcker, 1997).13 In the US telecommunica-
tions industry, Banker, Chang and Majumdar
(1995) find increasing competition is associated
with declining profitability. Consistent with techno-
logical innovation and competition conditions 
impacting the success rate of R&D, the value-rele-
vance of R&D varies across time periods and in-
dustries (Hall, 2000) and across technological
sectors (Greenhalgh and Rogers, 2006).14 Cohen
and Klepper (1992), among others, show there are
usually only a small number of high performing
R&D companies in an industry. Consistent with 
this evidence, Ceccagnoli, Arora, Cohen and Vogt
(1998) find that differences in the firms’capabilities
affect their ability and incentives to generate inno-
vations from R&D and absorb the innovations of ri-
vals (i.e. take advantage of rivals’ R&D). Several
studies find financial leverage is negatively related
to the level of R&D consistent with a life-cycle ef-
fect (Bernstein and Nadiri, 1982; Hall, 1991).
Vol. 38 No. 3 2008 International Accounting Policy Forum. 225
13 Examples of additional organisational competencies lead-
ing to shorter cycle times and superior performance are the use
of cross-functional teams, customer involvement in the inno-
vation process, advanced design tools, and higher quality of
resulting products (see Ittner and Larcker, 1997).
14 Hall (1993a, 1993b) finds the late ’60s and ’70s were pe-
riods of higher valuation of R&D in capital markets, which de-
clined abruptly during the eighties in the United States. It is
generally held this decline relates to company restructuring
and the declining value of R&D assets due to rapid technical
change in particular industries, including electrical equipment,
computing, electronics and scientific instruments (i.e. R&D
benefits were relatively short-lived).
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In summary, R&D and IP are not commonly re-
ported as assets by managers under GAAP, and,
therefore, evidence on value-relevance is limited.
Assets found to be reliable enough to be value-rel-
evant include independently valued R&D-in-
process, capitalised IP, as part of the identifiable
intangible assets voluntarily recognised by
Australian firms, and capitalised software R&D
under SFAS No. 86. R&D assets are not value-rel-
evant in the Australian setting, when companies
could report more informative identifiable intangi-
bles, which are presumably more reliable than
R&D assets (i.e. some of the identifiable intangi-
bles are output from successful R&D). No other
specific inferences about reliability are possible
from this evidence. Finally, a range of factors are
important for understanding the probable success
and hence reliability of R&D, including cycle
time-based competition, industry structure, firm-
specific capabilities, life-cycle stage, and technol-
ogy-conditions.
3.1.2. R&D and IP – researcher estimated asset
The US FASB has been sceptical about the reli-
ability of R&D. In SFAS No. 2 Accounting for
Research and Development Costs (para. 41), the
FASB states that a ‘direct relationship between re-
search and development costs and specific future
revenue generally has not been demonstrated’. Lev
and Sougiannis (1996) examine this proposition
by estimating the R&D assets and amortisation
that would have been reported by US companies
had they been allowed to capitalise R&D. They re-
state the earnings and book value of shareholders’
equity using these estimates of R&D assets and
amortisation and find the (pro forma) R&D assets
are value-relevant. They also find an association
with future period stock returns, suggesting that
the pro forma R&D is relevant but not that reli-
able. This forward relation leads them to conclude
that R&D intense stocks either are mispriced be-
cause investors do not understand conservative ac-
counting or attract a risk premium due to the
uncertainty associated with the R&D outcomes.
The risk premium conclusion is consistent with
Boone and Raman’s (2001) evidence that R&D in-
tensive firms have higher bid-ask spreads com-
pared with less R&D intensive firms. Chambers,
Jennings and Thompson (2002) argue that, if the
full expensing effects of R&D on the financial
statements mislead investors, then excess returns
earned from trading strategies associated with
R&D intensive firms may be reduced or eliminat-
ed by alternative R&D accounting policies that
better reflect the expected future benefits of R&D
activities. They tested this hypothesis, and their
evidence suggests the ability to earn excess returns
from trading on R&D intensive companies is not
due to GAAP-induced mispricing. The excess re-
turns may therefore be a risk premium consistent
with the economic properties discussed in Section
2.2. Lev, Sarath and Sougiannis (2005) also pro-
vide evidence that the firms with a high growth
rate of R&D relative to their profitability are sys-
tematically undervalued. Both the risk and mis-
pricing conclusions are consistent with R&D
being a relevant but not reliable indicator of ex-
pected inflows from R&D. It is possible that the
risk is at least partly due to the aggregate nature of
R&D, where the firm bundles a range of expendi-
tures whose identity and links to future benefits are
not visible to outsiders.
The studies reviewed so far suggest that R&D is
reliable enough to be value-relevant in general.
However, as discussed at the beginning of 
Section 3, it is difficult to obtain direct tests of the
reliability of R&D using stock price or financial
measures as an economic benchmark.
One of the few studies able to provide direct in-
sights on the reliability of R&D is Healy, Myers
and Howe (2002). They use a simulation model for
a pharmaceutical company to generate 32 years of
data for 500 companies from formation to steady
state. Parameters from these processes are used to
construct a cash flow model and financial state-
ments. The model simulates the drug discovery
(R&D input) process (year 1), to commercial
launch of a series of products (year 14), to maturi-
ty and expiry of patent (26 years), using underly-
ing costs, probabilities of success and revenues.
The model allows for some of the dynamic aspects
of the industry, for example, drugs that are signif-
icant innovations, average or commercially unsuc-
cessful drugs, rivals’ competitive entry with
competing drugs, and next generation drugs. The
economic value of the simulated R&D firm is
known, and the imposition of different accounting
rules gives insights into the relevance and reliabil-
ity of R&D.
Using the simulation data, Healy et al. (2002) in-
vestigate the relevance and reliability of R&D
under three methods of accounting: (1) immediate
expensing; (2) full cost capitalising of all R&D ex-
cept basic research and expensing over the life of
the drug once in commercial production; and (3)
successful efforts made in capitalising successful
drugs and writing down those found to be unsuc-
cessful. They find the successful efforts method of
accounting for R&D is most value-relevant.
However, their tests suggest there are large meas-
urement errors in the financial accounting data
under all the accounting methods examined.
Hence, their study suggests the R&D is relevant but
not that reliable due to economic uncertainty about
the success rate of the individual company’s R&D.
In summary, researcher estimated R&D assets
are reliable enough to be value-relevant. However,
R&D assets are also associated with future stock
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returns, suggesting investors do not find expected
benefits from R&D reliable enough to fully im-
pound in this year’s (contemporaneous) stock
price. Healy et al.’s (2002) evidence is consistent
with R&D assets being relevant but not a reliable
indicator of future rents. The Healy et al. paper is
one of the very few able to provide direct evidence
on reliability. An important area for future research
is one that devises research designs capable of
both distinguishing between relevance and relia-
bility and provides direct tests of reliability.
3.1.3. R&D and IP – annual R&D expenditures
Annual expenditures on R&D related IP are not
routinely reported. However, R&D expenditures
are available from surveys and as a result of ac-
counting standards in some countries, for example,
the US standard SFAS No. 2 Accounting for
Research and Development Costs and the R&D
data from the Industry R&D Survey conducted by
the US Census Bureau and National Science
Foundation. Using these data sources, a large num-
ber of studies find a positive significant relation-
ship between R&D expenditures and investors’
valuation of the firm as reflected in stock price.15
However, while R&D is generally value-relevant,
taken as a package, the evidence below suggests
R&D expenditures are not that reliable as an indi-
cator of the timing and magnitude of future bene-
fits. In particular, investors do not appear to find 
it easy to evaluate the future earnings implications
of the R&D expenditures, consistent with the un-
certainty properties of intangibles outlined in
Section 2.2.
One reason R&D expenditures are not reliable
indicators of future rents is that these outlays do
not directly produce a stream of revenues from the
sale of products. Conceptually, earnings from
R&D are more variable because R&D involves
search and discovery and problem-solving activi-
ties whose success is uncertain (Dosi, 1988).
Using the variability of future earnings (variance
of realised annual earnings over five years) as the
dependent variable, Kothari et al. (1999) provide
evidence that the benefits from R&D expenditures
are more variable, and hence less reliable, than the
benefits from capital expenditures for a sample of
over 50,000 firm-year observations for
1972–1992. Kothari et al. find a coefficient on cur-
rent R&D expenditures about three times the coef-
ficient on current capital expenditures (controlling
for leverage and firm size). Amir et al. (2002) find
that this greater future earnings variability effect is
largely confined to firms in more R&D intensive
industries and not to other industries.
Some doubt exists over the completeness of the
measures of R&D expenditures. Hansen and Serin
(1997) show that R&D expenditures are a hidden
cost in some low-technology industries, for exam-
ple, process innovation costs that are not separate-
ly reported but are bundled with production costs
in manufacturing. Further, companies do not dis-
close what types of expenditures are actually in-
cluded in their R&D expenses. Some expenditure
included in R&D has more direct implications for
future earnings and earnings variability compared
with other expenditures.
Overall, this evidence on the greater variability
of earnings from R&D is consistent with the dif-
ferent purposes of the R&D and capital invest-
ments: R&D produces innovations while capital
expenditures produce products that embody the in-
novations. This relation has been demonstrated
empirically using Granger causation tests (Lach
and Schankerman, 1989; Lach and Rob, 1996).
That is, R&D comes first and fixed capital invest-
ment comes later, once fixed assets are needed to
produce the goods ready to sell to customers.
Further, current R&D includes soon-to-be success-
ful as well as some (potentially a lot of) unsuc-
cessful expenditures, which suggests fairly clearly
that evaluating R&D expenditures alone, in the ab-
sence of information about the probability of suc-
cess, will not provide a lot of insights on value.
Sougiannis (1994) provides indirect evidence on
the reliability of R&D expenditures for a sample of
573 US firms engaged in R&D between 1975 and
1985. Sougiannis estimates two equations captur-
ing (1) the R&D association with earnings, and (2)
the R&D association with market value.16
Sougiannis finds one dollar of R&D is associated
with a two-dollar gross profit increase over a
seven-year period and a five-dollar increase in
market value. However, he finds only the current
R&D expenditures are positively and significantly
associated with the firm’s market value of equity.
By contrast, past R&D is unrelated to the market
value of equity. This result suggests no more 
benefits are expected from the past R&D, 
Vol. 38 No. 3 2008 International Accounting Policy Forum. 227
15 See Ben Zion (1978); Ben Zion (1984); Griliches (1981);
Hirschey (1982); Connolly, Hirsch and Hirschey (1986); Jaffe
(1986); Ettredge and Bublitz (1988); Bublitz and Ettredge
(1989); Chan, Martin and Kensinger (1990); Connolly and
Hirschey (1990); Griliches, Hall and Pakes (1991); Shevlin
(1991); Hall (1993a); (1993b); Johnson and Pazderka (1993);
Megna and Klock (1993); Chauvin and Hirschey (1994);
Sougiannis (1994); Lev and Sougiannis (1996); Deng and Lev
(1998); Stoneman and Toivanen (1997); Aboody and Lev
(1998).
16 Earnings and price are endogenous in this specification:
(1) (Earnings after tax & before extraordinaries, advertising
and R&D expense) = f (net capital stock measured as inflation
adjusted items: PPE+inventories+intangibles+other invest-
ments, advertising; and current and lagged R&D expendi-
tures); (2) Price/BV equity = f (book value equity, abnormal
earnings adjusted for R&D expensing and tax, R&D tax
shield, current R&D costs, lagged R&D outlays). From this
analysis he derives (a) the total effect of past and current R&D
on earnings, (b) the indirect effect of R&D on stock price
through earnings, and (c) the direct effect of R&D on stock
price.
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meaning none of the past R&D are assets and all
the benefits have already been received, which
seems implausible. A more plausible alternative
explanation is that investors are uncertain about
the probability of future benefits from the past
R&D. Overall, Sougiannis’ evidence suggests
R&D is value-relevant, but the time series of R&D
is not a reliable predictor of future rents.
Green et al. (1996) cast doubt on the value-rele-
vance of R&D expenditures in the UK setting for
1990, 1991 and 1992. They find the R&D expen-
ditures are significant in 1991 but are not reliably
value-relevant in 1990 and 1992. However, their
dependent variable is the difference between the
market value and book value of shareholders’ eq-
uity (MVE-BVE). This variable provides a test of
the relations between R&D and the excess market
value over the book value of assets, not the level of
the firm’s market value of equity. This excess may
not fully capture investors’ expectations of the
lead/lag relations between R&D and the expected
benefits. Further, this excess variable is regressed
on earnings, current R&D expenses plus a number
of control variables, some of which are likely to be
correlated with (proxy for) the level of R&D ex-
penses or the risk of the R&D, leading to a value-
irrelevance result.17 More recent UK evidence for
1990–1994 (Stark and Thomas, 1998) and
1990–2001 (Akbar and Stark, 2003) finds that
R&D is value-relevant in the UK setting.
Another explanation for the Green et al. (1996)
results is a lack of power due to under (or no) re-
porting of R&D expenditures by the UK firms.
Stoneman and Toivanen (1997) encounter this prob-
lem in their UK study. They employ a research de-
sign that allows for sample selection bias due to the
non-reporting of R&D. For 1989–1995, they find
R&D is value-relevant for UK firms. The valuation
multiple ranges between zero and 4.3, and they find
the multiple varies over time and across the firms.
One further issue in the UK setting, for R&D
value-relevance studies prior to 1996, is the UK
GAAP impact on reported intangibles. Companies
predominantly wrote off goodwill to an equity ac-
count in this time period but were able to report
identifiable intangibles such as brands. If the
goodwill write-offs significantly understate intan-
gible assets, then it is possible that regression co-
efficients on assets in the model could be biased
due to omitted correlated variables. Shah, Stark
and Akbar (2007) consider the issue of omitted ad-
vertising costs in the UK studies of the value-rele-
vance of R&D. Advertising cost data had not been
available in the UK until the advent of the
ACNielsen MEAL data. This organisation moni-
tors media outlets and assigns standard costs to 
advertising activities. Using this data to control 
for advertising costs, Shah et al. (2007) find R&D
is (positively) value-relevant in the UK for all 
firm size groups and for manufacturing and non-
manufacturing sectors, as well as the R&D intense
pharmaceutical, biotechnology, electronics, and
electrical equipment sectors.
Several studies examine factors that impact the
value-relevance of R&D expenditures. One impor-
tant factor is the project stage. For example,
Shortridge (2004) provides evidence that the track
record of new drug approvals conditions the rela-
tion between R&D and stock price for a sample of
US pharmaceutical companies. Hand (2001) finds
investors expect more successful outcomes from
more intense R&D and find more information in
R&D for growth firms rather than established
biotechnology firms. Investors therefore appear to
understand that the information in R&D about fu-
ture benefits varies according to the firm’s life-
cycle and project stage.18
A further issue in interpreting the R&D studies is
the model specification. In contrast to other ac-
counting studies, Hand (2001) uses a Cobb-Douglas
function (commonly used in economic studies)
which allows for the diminishing marginal return
from R&D. More generally, Hall and Kim (1999)
report that non-linear and log-linear functional
forms best approximate the R&D relation with
stock price. A survey of the economic literature sug-
gests the likely reason for non-linearity is techno-
logical and firm life-cycles, and the changes in
returns to investment at inflection points in the cy-
cles (Geroski, 2000). This non-linearity is corrobo-
rated by accounting studies that suggest the relation
between earnings, as a summary measure including
R&D and other expenditures, and stock returns is
non-linear (Cheng et al., 1992; Freeman and Tse,
1992; Das and Lev, 1994; Subramanyam, 1996).
In summary, taken together, the evidence in this
section from a variety of different research designs,
including the earnings variability tests, suggests
R&D expenditures reflect information that is
value-relevant. However, the information is not as
reliable in reflecting future benefits as the informa-
tion conveyed by expenditures on tangible assets.
Several plausible explanations are canvassed. The
dominant factor is the role of R&D which relates to
future rents rather than current production rev-
enues. Current R&D also includes both value-rele-
vant successful and value-irrelevant unsuccessful
228 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
17 Green et al. (1996) control variables comprise market
share, concentration, debt-to-equity, average industry debt-to-
equity, square of the difference between debt-to-equity of firm
and industry, and annual variability of stock market returns.
18 Liu (2007) finds the firm’s life-cycle is an omitted vari-
able in commonly used discretionary accrual models, with the
inferences from earnings management studies changing once
life-cycle is included in the models. Anthony and Ramesh
(1992) show that the stock price response to accounting per-
formance measures, sales growth and capital investment is a
function of firm life-cycle stage.
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expenditures. While the projects are incomplete
and success rates are not known, the R&D is not re-
liable as an indicator of value. It is possible that
R&D is also less relevant in some circumstances
(e.g. less relevant for established than for growth
firms). Hence, evaluating R&D expenditures with
probable success rate indicators is important to get
insights on relevance, reliability and value. Some
information that is relevant to this task includes
new drug approvals for pharmaceuticals, more in-
tensive R&D, and growth firms’ R&D.
Finally, it is not clear from the evidence to date
that reporting the aggregate, R&D expenditures, as
a separate line item in the income statement is all
that informative about value creation. Outsiders do
not know what is included in R&D and whether
the inclusions relate directly to future rents. It is
possible to identify more informative categories of
expenditures for separate line item reporting and
as inputs to valuation (Hunter, Webster and Wyatt,
2007).
3.1.4. R&D and IP – input metrics
The firm’s production function is conditioned on
the state of science and technological knowledge
(Jorgenson, 1989). To test the impact of technolo-
gy as a conditioning factor on the value-relevance
of R&D and IP, Greenhalgh and Rogers (2006)
condition their analysis on an augmented version
of Pavitt’s (1984) technology sectors, comprising
the following:
1. Supplier-dominated manufacturing and mining:
usually smaller firms with weak in-house R&D
and engineering capabilities and innovations
coming from equipment and materials suppliers;
2. Production- and scale-intensive: large firms
producing standard materials or durable goods;
3. Production-intensive, specialised suppliers: ma-
chinery and instruments, tending to be smaller
technologically specialised firms;
4. Science-based: electronics, electrical and chem-
icals, usually large firms with in-house R&D-
based technology but the basic science is
produced elsewhere;
5. Information-intensive: includes finance, retail,
communications, publishing, with in-house
software or systems development, with pur-
chases of IT hardware and software;
6. Software-related firms: computer software and
services.
Using the log of the market value of equity as the
dependent variable, Greenhalgh and Rogers find
the magnitude of the coefficient on R&D varies
substantially across technology sectors. It is lowest
for ‘6. Software’ followed by ‘4. Science’ (which
spends 45–55% of the total R&D across all six sec-
tors). The highest coefficient is for ‘2. Production-
and scale-intensive’ and ‘5. Information-intensive’.
The ‘Science’ sector result is probably due to the
average 20-year lag from an idea to a successful
science innovation (Stephan, 1996). Including
(total asset deflated) patent and trademark data in
the regressions does not affect these coefficients.
They find the UK patents are less value-relevant
than the European Patent Office patents.
Trademarks generally have positive and signifi-
cant coefficients in each sector. They find the most
competitive technological sectors have the lowest
market value of R&D. Within the most competi-
tive technology sector (science-based manufactur-
ing), firms with larger market shares (proxying for
lower competition) have higher R&D valuations.
Matolcsy and Wyatt (2008) use patent metrics ag-
gregated to the technology sector level (within in-
dustries) as technology input metrics, to test
whether the association between the market value of
equity and current earnings is conditional on the
technology conditions. Three technology conditions
(within the industry dominating the firms’ opera-
tions) are considered: the success rate of past tech-
nological investments, technology complexity, and
the technology development period. Using the mar-
ket value of equity deflated by sales, they find the
technology condition-earnings interactions are
value-relevant. The results hold across a range of
high-, medium- and low-technology industries con-
sistent with the predicted pervasive effects of tech-
nology conditions on the firms’ operations. The
three technology conditions also predict future earn-
ings, which is a pre-requisite for value-relevance.
In summary, the value-relevance of R&D varies
substantially across technology sectors, suggesting
technology conditions impact the success rate and
hence expected rents from R&D. It is difficult to
know whether this is due to variation in value-rele-
vance or reliability, or both of these. Measures of
the technological innovation success rate, cycle
time, and links to science in a technology sector
condition the relations between current earnings and
the market value of equity, suggesting the pervasive
impact of technology on performance and value.
3.1.5. R&D and IP – output metrics
Patents are output metrics which are used as
measures of invention and/or protection arising
from IP laws (Lanjouw et al., 1998). The distribu-
tion of patents is substantially skewed to low value
patents.19 Researchers also find the rate of decline
Vol. 38 No. 3 2008 International Accounting Policy Forum. 229
19 Patent protection is reduced by the capacity of imitators
to ‘invent around’ a patent, by the difficulties actually secur-
ing patents on some innovations, and by the problem that
patents can disclose information sufficient to facilitate imita-
tors’ development of variants of the basic technology; and
these problems are typically viewed as greater for process in-
novations than for product innovations (see Geroski, 1995).
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in the value of patents is also much higher than the
rate for most physical assets (Cockburn and
Griliches, 1988; Schankerman and Pakes, 1986;
Pakes, 1986; Schankerman, 1991). Therefore,
variation in the use and value of IP renders simple
counts of patents not very useful for valuation pur-
poses (Griliches, 1990).
Early studies found patents are value-relevant
incrementally to a measure of intangible capital
computed from past R&D expenditures (e.g.
Griliches, 1981; Pakes, 1985; Cockburn and
Griliches, 1988; Megna and Klock, 1993).
Greenhalgh and Rogers (2006) find patents are in-
crementally value-relevant to R&D for UK firms
for 1989–2002.
Following the early work using count measures,
researchers found patent renewal and patent fami-
ly size are useful for computing quality weights for
patent count data (Lanjouw et al., 1998). Rather
than simply count patents, the patents are parti-
tioned into groups according to the age the patent
is allowed to lapse, or by the set of countries in
which patent applications were filed. Serrano
(2006) also examines the decision to sell patents as
a measure of value. Bessen (2007) develops and
tests a more complex model that gives an upper
bound estimate of the value-relevance of patents to
the firm. His results are qualitatively similar to the
valuation results using the renewal and selling
measures. Bessen (2007), among others, finds that
chemical and pharmaceutical patents are more
valuable than patents in other industries.
Citation analysis is a measurement approach
which provides a quality weighting to augment
simple count measures of IP (Narin, 2000). High
citations to scientific research papers, and from
current to prior issued patents, indicate important
scientific and technological inventions. For exam-
ple, a US patent has eight or nine ‘References
Cited – US patents’ on its front page, two refer-
ences cited to foreign patents, and one to two non-
patent references. These references link the patent
to the related prior art (related patented invention)
and also limit the claims of the current issued
patent. Like the patent distribution, the citation
distribution is skewed. For example, Narin (2000)
reports that for patents issued in 1988, and cited in
the next seven years, half the patents are cited two
or fewer times, 75% are cited five or fewer times,
and only 1% of the patents are cited 24 or more
times.
Studies linking citations to the market value of
equity find citations to prior patents, and to scien-
tific papers, are value-relevant. For example, Hall,
Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2005) find patent citations
are incrementally value-relevant over R&D to as-
sets, patents to R&D, and assets, for a sample of
companies from 1963 to 1995. They find one ad-
ditional citation per patent is associated with a 3%
higher stock price, unanticipated citations have 
a stronger effect on stock price, and citations to 
the companies’ own prior related patents are 
more valuable than external citations. Hirschey,
Richardson and Scholtz (1998) also find patent
metrics computed from patent count and citation
data are incrementally value-relevant to earnings,
book value of shareholders’ equity, R&D expendi-
tures and pro forma R&D capital.
Another factor to consider is the value implica-
tions from the strategic use of IP. Cohen, Nelson
and Walsh (2000) provide large sample survey ev-
idence that firms patent for more reasons than di-
rect protection of profits. Firms use patents to
prevent rivals from patenting related inventions
(e.g. blocking rivals’ patents by chemical firms),
the use of patents in negotiations (e.g. by telecom-
munications companies) and the prevention of law
suits. Other strategies used with or instead of IP to
protect profits from invention include secrecy, lead
time advantages, and complementary marketing
and manufacturing capabilities. In fact, Cohen et al.
find that secrecy and lead time are generally more
important than patents for protecting the profits of
manufacturing firms.
Schankerman and Noel (2006) investigate the
proposition that ‘strategic patenting’ raises the
costs of innovating for rival firms, using two out-
put metrics to proxy for strategic patenting activi-
ties: patent portfolio size, which they argue affects
bargaining power in patent disputes, and the frag-
mentation of patent rights, which increases the
costs of enforcement. Consistent with these strate-
gies increasing their own inventive activity and
own benefits from invention, they find these met-
rics are positively associated with innovation ac-
tivity and with the market value of equity, for a
sample of software firms in the period 1980–99.
Henkel and Reitzig (2007) study patent blocking
whereby firms patent solely with the intent of
blocking other companies’ R&D-related innova-
tions. They show that patent blocking is a viable
strategy in competitive, higher technology indus-
tries, if the ‘blockers’ focus on inventions that they
can easily invent around and where the ‘blocking
patent infringements’ (that the ‘blocker’ issues
against rivals’ related patents) are more readily up-
held in court.
By contrast, McGahan and Silverman (2006)
find, in circumstances where a technological
breakthrough creates investment opportunities for
all firms in the industry, the positive effects of ad-
ditional knowledge and opportunities outweighs
the negative impact of the patent blocking strategy.
Hence, the significance of invention appears to in-
teract with the strategic use of IP to influence per-
formance and firm value.
In summary, patent metrics that are quality
weighted, such as using citations to prior patents,
230 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
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are reliable enough to be value-relevant and are
more value-relevant than simple patent counts. It
is unclear whether this effect relates to more rele-
vance or reliability or more of both. Output meas-
ures of strategic patenting are value-relevant.
3.2. Advertising expenditures, brands, and IP
Brands and trademark (IP) assets are output from
prior investments in advertising and expenditures
associated with product development and trade-
mark registration. They generate value through
market power and signalling of product and, possi-
bly, seller attributes. These assets can be exchanged
and operated independently of specific human cap-
ital. For example, newspaper businesses with mast-
heads can be sold and operated independently of
the parties who developed the mastheads.
3.2.1. Advertising expenditures, brands, and IP –
management reported assets
Prior to the FRS 10 issue in 1998, when brand
recognition was allowed in the UK, Muller (1999)
finds the UK firms capitalised their brands to meet
financial ratio-based rules set by the London Stock
Exchange (LSE). These LSE rules waive share-
holder approval for acquisitions below certain fi-
nancial thresholds. For a sample of 33 UK
companies for 1988–1996, Muller (1999) reports
the firms had previously written off their pur-
chased goodwill, and now with a weak balance
sheet, put capitalised brands onto their balance
sheets to avoid the costly LSE rules. Hence, the
motivation for capitalising the brands is not to
communicate with investors, at least, as a first
order effect.
Despite this motivation, Kallapur and Kwan
(2004) find the goodwill and identifiable intangi-
bles of UK companies, including brands and 
publishing titles, are reliable enough to be value-
relevant. Their firms’ median brand assets are a
large 44% of the book value of shareholders’ equi-
ty. However, Kallapur and Kwan provide further
evidence suggesting that the value-relevance of
the brands was adversely affected by incentives to
(1) avoid LSE rules requiring shareholder ap-
proval for large acquisition or disposal transac-
tions; and (2) reduce leverage. They conclude the
brands are value-relevant but their reliability
varies with managements’ financial reporting mo-
tivations.
In summary, management reported brands prior
to 1998 in the UK were reliable enough to be
value-relevant. However, the brands were less
value-relevant and/or less reliable for firms capi-
talising for agency reasons. It is not clear which of
these is descriptive.
3.2.2. Advertising expenditures, brands, and IP –
researcher estimated assets
Seethamraju (2000) constructs measures of 
internally generated US brand names, from the 
intensity of advertising expense, and finds these
estimates are value-relevant. Hence, this evidence
suggests brands valued by external parties using
publicly available expenditures data are reliable
enough to be value-relevant.
3.2.3. Advertising expenditures, brands, and IP –
annual advertising expenditures
There is a positive relationship between adver-
tising expenditures and stock price.20 However,
some studies find a significant association only for
expenditures on non-durable goods.21 In tests re-
lating advertising to sales, researchers find adver-
tising is associated with current rather than future
sales, which suggests the benefits are short-lived
(e.g. Boyer, 1974; Clarke, 1976; Grabowski, 1976;
Lambin, 1976). Netter (1982) examines whether
firms spend too much on advertising, leading to a
weak relation with stock price. He finds the adver-
tising of competitors reduces the effectiveness 
of non-durable producers’ advertising outlays.
Hence, advertising generates value conditional on
product type and competition conditions.
The economics of advertising suggests advertis-
ing is linked to value creation through the process-
es of new product development and adoption. As
summarised by Nakamura (2005), advertising
helps consumers to learn more quickly about the
existence and properties of new products, thereby
facilitating the flow of benefits and financial re-
wards from innovation to the producers and con-
sumers. Since new products have increased in
economic importance, this suggests the impor-
tance of advertising as a continuing long-run in-
vestment.
Advertising has another potentially important
benefit. These costs are often packaged as a joint
product with entertainment, such as free-to-air
radio and television. Borden (1942) shows that
about half of the total advertising costs in 1937
went to fund entertainment including live artists
and leases of phonographs. In relation to the side
benefits of advertising, Noll et al. (1973) estimate
the value of the rise of television to consumers at
about 5.1% of household income in 1969.
What determines the longevity of advertising
benefits? Nakamura (2005) suggests longevity is 
a function of product innovation and adoption.
Berndt et al. (1994) provide insights on this issue.
They decompose advertising expenditures to 
separate out industry-expanding investment from
rivalry inducing expenditures. They focus on the
Vol. 38 No. 3 2008 International Accounting Policy Forum. 231
20 See, for example, Hirschey (1982), Hirschey and
Weygandt (1985), and Chauvin and Hirschey (1993).
21 See Peles (1970), Abdel-khalik (1975), Ettredge and
Bublitz (1988), Bublitz and Ettredge (1989), and Hirschey and
Weygandt (1985).
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market for ulcer drugs (H2-antagonist drugs:
Tagamet, Zantac, Pepcid and Axid). For the rival-
ry inducing component, they find advertising costs
and industry sales are negatively related in cir-
cumstances when the number of products on offer
in the industry is increasing. Advertising costs
under these conditions depreciate at a fast annual
rate of 40%. By contrast, the industry-expanding
component appears to have an almost zero rate of
depreciation.
In summary, advertising expenditures are value-
relevant in the short term but the evidence is mixed
for the long term. It is possible the mixed evidence
is due to a lack of value-relevance for companies
spending too much on advertising. Alternatively,
the mixed evidence could be due to uncertainty
about future benefits and hence lack of reliability.
It is not clear from the evidence, which is descrip-
tive. Another possibility is gaps in the modelling
of the costs and benefits of advertising. In particu-
lar, the theory suggests insights on value creation
may come from modelling the context of the links
between advertising expenditures and market
value of equity, focusing on the effects of product
innovation and adoption and joint product costs
and benefits. These gaps in the literature call for
studies of the long-term effects of advertising ex-
penditures, which have been less common to date
due to problems obtaining data, along with gaps 
in our understanding of consumer behaviour
(Vakratas and Ambler, 1999).
3.2.4. Advertising expenditures, brands, and IP –
input metrics
Franses and Vriens (2004) point out the amount
of money companies allocate to advertising often
surpasses the companies’ after tax profits, but still
it is not known whether these investments pay off
or not. They argue the reason for this gap is in-
complete knowledge about what advertising does
in the marketplace and list four factors that are im-
portant for understanding the returns to advertising
inputs:
1. The process by which advertising affects con-
sumers and leads to brand awareness, brand
image, brand consideration, brand choice, and
sales;
2. How the effects of advertising are spread out
over time;
3. The role of different advertising media (for ex-
ample, TV versus print advertising), how differ-
entially efficient these vehicles are, how their
interaction may lead to synergy effects; and
4. The role and impact of competitive advertising.
These factors suggest the range of input metrics
that are relevant to estimates of value creation and
longevity of benefits from advertising, for exam-
ple, consumer purchasing, repeat business and
switching metrics, firms’ advertising strategies, in-
cluding the frequency and magnitude of efforts,
media use metrics, experience and search attrib-
utes of products, and the interaction effects with
the purpose of advertising (e.g. market share
growth, and price premium support).
One area of research having some success in
modelling strategy impact on value are studies of
optimal scheduling of advertising over time. One
example by Dube, Hitsch and Manchanda (2004)
is a study of a pulsing strategy in which the firm
advertises in sharp, intensive bursts. They develop
a dynamic programming framework and find that
pulsing is the optimal strategy for the industry sec-
tor they study.
Aside from the modelling method employed, the
success of the Dube et al. model is due to high-
quality input metrics, which contrasts with other
studies in this area that use the available, patchy
advertising expenditures. The data is Scantrac
level scanner data for frozen entrée foodstuff,
comprising weekly sales, prices and advertising
levels for each brand in 18 cities over 155 weeks.
Advertising level is measured using gross rating
points rather than dollars, which captures house-
hold average exposures to advertising in various
markets per week. The long weekly series and the
benchmark rating data allows pulse behaviour to
be tested (i.e. this is not easy to do with annual or
quarterly data and raw dollars). Interestingly, their
results suggest continuous advertising is sub-opti-
mal.
In summary, quality input data relating to con-
sumer behaviour and firms’ advertising strategies
over time are important for measuring and under-
standing how advertising creates value for the
firm. The evidence suggests that it is important to
study advertising expenditures in the context of
strategy and consumer behaviour to get insights on
value creation. An example of such an insight re-
lates to advertising strategy for which there is evi-
dence that continuous advertising rather than a
pulsing advertising strategy can destroy value.
3.2.5. Advertising expenditures, brands, and IP –
output metrics
Trademarks are intermediate output measures
that are potentially valuable when firms use them
to signal desirable product attributes to consumers,
thereby reducing information asymmetries be-
tween sellers and buyers (Landes and Posner,
1987). Trademarks may create value by motivating
the firm to invest in quality products (Mendonca,
Pereira and Godinho, 2004) and engage in innova-
tion activity and the building of brand value and
barriers to entry (Schmalensee, 1978).
Consistent with trademarks generating value,
Greenhalgh and Rogers (2006) find trademarks are
232 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
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incrementally value-relevant to R&D and patents
for UK firms for 1989–2002. They find the trade-
marking firms experience 10–30% higher produc-
tivity compared with non-trademarking firms.
Further, trademarking activity, and the intensity of
trademarking, is associated with larger differences
in the market value of equity and productivity
among firms in the services industries compared to
manufacturing firms.
Barth et al. (1998) test the value-relevance of
output measures of brand values from Financial
World’s (FW) annual brand value surveys.22 For a
sample of 595 US firm-years with brands valued
between 1991 and 1996, Barth et al. (1998) find
the FW brand values (changes in brand values) are
significantly positively associated with the market
value of equity (stock returns). The FW brand val-
ues are incrementally value-relevant (for market
value of equity) to advertising expense, operating
margin, growth, market share, recognised brand
assets, and analysts’ earnings forecasts. The FW
sample is not random. It is dominated by large,
profitable companies in food and tobacco, chemi-
cals and allied products, rubber, plastic, leather,
and glass industries, and under-represented by fi-
nancial services. Whether brands in general can be
valued as successfully is unclear.
In summary, trademarks are value-relevant and
appear to be particularly significant value drivers
for firms in services industries with a significant
but lower impact in manufacturing. The evidence
does not distinguish whether this effect relates to
lower relevance or reliability, or both. A possible
impact of trademarking activity is to motivate the
firm to engage in further value-creating product
and brand innovations. While this might be moti-
vated by the desire to build the trademark value,
there is the potential for feedback effects for the
firm’s R&D outlays, which may build additional
value in the future via the product pipeline and
brands. While brands do not have IP rights at-
tached, they are value-relevant for large profitable
companies, suggesting they are significant indica-
tors of market power. It is not known whether the
independent valuations of brands used by Barth et
al. (1998) could be successfully undertaken for
firms in general at the same level of reliability.
3.3. Customer loyalty
A number of studies examine whether customer
satisfaction measures relating to the firm’s product
markets are value-relevant. The impetus for this
research is marketing studies that propose cus-
tomer satisfaction is a key value driver because it
reflects information about customer retention,
price elasticity reduction, brand and reputation ef-
fects (Anderson et al., 1994). Further, there is evi-
dence that companies value and track this data
(Ross and Georgoff, 1991). There is some overlap
between the value represented by brands and cus-
tomer loyalty assets, although no known studies
examine how this might relate to the propensity to
create value (e.g. does the interaction between
these two constructs generate synergies for the
firm?).
3.3.1. Customer loyalty – management reported
assets
GAAP standards do not provide for the reporting
of customer loyalty assets.
3.3.2. Customer loyalty – researcher estimated
asset
A lot of the evidence on the value-relevance of
customer loyalty comes from survey-based output
metrics produced by researchers, research insti-
tutes, or the firms themselves (e.g. Ittner and
Larcker, 1998). The evidence from the survey met-
rics is mixed in part because the survey data is col-
lected by different companies and organisations
using different instruments, subjects, and time pe-
riods, which makes the results of the studies hard
to interpret (Boyd et al., 2004).
By contrast, Gupta et al. (2004) provide evi-
dence on the contribution of customers to value
using primarily publicly available information.
They provide novel evidence that the long-term
value of the firm’s customer base is a good proxy
for the market value of equity. They first develop a
model to value the firm’s long-term customer base
using the following information: a forecast of cus-
tomers to be acquired in the future, average cus-
tomer acquisition costs, profit margin per
customer, and customer retention rate. These cus-
tomer value drivers comprise both financial and
non-financial information, some of which are in-
puts to value (e.g. acquisition costs) and some are
outputs to value (e.g. customer retention).
Estimates from the customer valuation model are
close to the market value of equity for three
(Capital One, Ameritrade, E*Trade) of the five
firms considered (the measure undervalues
Amazon and eBay, which many analysts believed
were over-valued at the time).
Consistent with other studies, Gupta et al. (2004)
find customer retention has the biggest impact on
customer value, in the order of 3 to 7% for a 1%
increase in retention. By contrast, profit margin
Vol. 38 No. 3 2008 International Accounting Policy Forum. 233
22 FW reports value estimates, sales, and operating margins
for individual brands, by industry, as well as the percentage
change in the brand value from the previous year. Brand
strength multiples for each brand, obtained from Interbrand,
are a weighted metric computed from seven components: 
(1) Leadership (maximum 25 points); (2) Stability (maximum
15 points); (3) Market (maximum 10 points); (4) Internationality
(maximum 25 points); (5) Trend (maximum 10 points); 
(6) Support (maximum 10 points); and (7) Protection (maxi-
mum 5 points).
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per customer has a 1% impact on customer value
while the cost of acquiring customers has a 0.02 to
0.3% effect on value. Further, they find a strong
interaction effect between the cost of capital and
retention rate. Specifically, the value of customers
in the high retention–low cost of capital context is
2.5 to 3 times the value in the low retention–high
discount rate setting. This finding suggests high
cost of capital companies would benefit more from
customer retention rather than containment of cus-
tomer acquisition costs.
In summary, issues relating to the reliability of
customer loyalty measures are a possible explana-
tion for the mixed value-relevance evidence for
measures obtained from survey data. Estimates of
the long-term value of the firm’s customer base,
and the specific drivers of this value (e.g. customer
retention), suggest this is an important policy area
for firms which warrants further research.
3.3.3. Customer loyalty – annual expenditures
Annual expenditures on customer loyalty are not
generally reported as separate line items in GAAP
financial statements.
3.3.4. Customer loyalty – input metrics
One input that is a driver of customer loyalty is
the quality of customer service. Decreasing levels
of customer service have been cited as a cause of
competitive decline (Roach, 1991). To provide ev-
idence on the information content of the firms’ ac-
tions to change their quality of customer service,
Nayyar (1995) employs an event study. This de-
sign has the capacity to indicate whether investors
actually used the information, subject to the re-
searcher adequately controlling for competing in-
formation. Nayyar argues that if improving
customer service leads to improved performance,
then actions that improve customer service should
be valued positively by the stock market when the
actions are announced. Using news reports from
business news databases, he identifies actions by
firms relating to changes in customer service over
1981–1991. Action (inputs) relate to four customer
service objectives: (1) risk of purchase; (2) pur-
chasing cost; (3) ease, convenience, cost of use;
and (4) personalisation. Nayyar finds that increas-
es (decreases) in customer service are positively
(negatively) valued by the stock market, as reflect-
ed in cumulative abnormal returns in the event
window. The strongest effects are for reducing the
risk of purchase (appearance of facilities and guar-
antees) and purchasing cost (customer service out-
lets, credit terms, computer links to buyers, and
operating hours).23
Like customer satisfaction, consumer switching
costs (brand loyalty) give the firm market power
over repeat purchasers. These costs make the
firm’s current market share an important determi-
nant of future profits and value (Klemperer, 2005).
Examples of factors that give rise to switching
costs include frequent flyer programs, computer
component compatibility, and the cost to learn to
use another brand.
The effects of consumer switching cost on firm
value are ambiguous. Benefits from high cus-
tomer retention may be off-set if switching costs
increase product prices over time to the point
where it is viable for consumers to switch brands.
Switching costs can discourage new entry to the
industry and generate inertia in product and
process innovation by reducing the firm’s incen-
tives to differentiate their products, thereby reduc-
ing competition. The extent of the value created
for the firm from consumer switching costs there-
fore depends on a careful analysis of the compet-
ing effects.
In summary, there is evidence that an input to
customer loyalty, changes in customer service
quality, is associated with cumulative changes in
unexpected stock returns. Firms have incentives to
create switching costs for consumers to build mar-
ket share. The challenge for researchers is to de-
fine and collect or construct concrete input
measures for tracking and studying customer loy-
alty components.
3.3.5. Customer loyalty – output metrics
Ittner and Larcker (1998) find that a customer
satisfaction output metric for a large telecommuni-
cations firm (survey of 2,491 from a total of
450,000 customers) is significantly positively and
non-linearly associated with customer retention,
revenue and revenue-change measures. Tests for
business unit customer satisfaction metrics from
73 retail banks (different metric to above) suggest
an indirect effect on accounting performance by
attracting new customers, consistent with the
bank’s strategic goal. However, while Ittner and
Larcker (1998) find another output metric from the
American Customer Satisfaction Index (ACSI)
survey is associated with the market value of equi-
ty, the relation is not consistent (significant in
transport, utility, communication; insignificant in
durable and non-durable manufacturing and finan-
cial services; significant and negative in retailing).
The ACSI metric gives rise to a positive an-
nouncement effect (on stock price) suggesting the
index conveys information to investors. The index
234 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
23 As compared with less valuable actions to change the
ease, convenience, and cost of use (customer service depart-
ment, technical assistance, toll-free numbers, discretionary
comfort features) or the personalisation of products (comput-
er to customise products, capacity to meet unique needs).
Specific customer service actions viewed most favourably by
the stock market are improved guarantees, increased operating
hours, greater customer service outlets, and better computer
links to buyers.
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is also positively significantly associated with
forecasted residual earnings, suggesting some of
the value is impounded in earnings.
The ACSI is one of the more standardised sur-
veys generating output metrics. It is a national eco-
nomic indicator managed by the National Quality
Research Center and the American Society of
Quality. The 15 questions in the survey are organ-
ised by four variables: perceived quality, customer
expectations, perceived value and customer satis-
faction. The customer satisfaction measure is com-
puted from three of the questions relating to
overall satisfaction, confirmation of expectations
and comparison with the ideal.
Jacobson and Mizik (2007) find the ACSI meas-
ure is only value-relevant for computer and inter-
net firms. Jacobson and Mizik (2007) use an
annual stock returns specification. The stock re-
turns test looks at relevance in terms of whether
this year’s change in customer satisfaction is asso-
ciated with this year’s changes in stock price,
whereas the stock price levels test does not refer to
a narrow time frame. These stock return tests sug-
gest the customer satisfaction measure may not
change enough to be value-relevant on an annual
changes basis but is value-relevant in a wider time
frame. Alternatively, the stock returns test poten-
tially lacks the power to detect value-relevance
and/or the ACSI metric is noisy.
Consistent with a forward-looking value cre-
ation effect, Banker et al. (2000) find the non-fi-
nancial measures of customer satisfaction,
likelihood a customer will return to the hotel and
customer complaints, are significantly positively
and negatively, respectively, associated with future
financial performance (business unit revenues and
operating profit) for a hotel chain. This data is col-
lected by the hotels. Their evidence suggests that
customer satisfaction is related more to long-term
rather than short-term performance. Further, they
find that changes in management incentive con-
tracts to include these non-financial performance
(output) metrics leads to improvements in both fi-
nancial and non-financial performance.
In summary, precise component level measures
of customer loyalty such as in Banker at al. (2000)
would help us to understand what drives customer
satisfaction in different industries and how to
measure the composite output indexes more pre-
cisely.
3.4. Competitive advantage
Two literatures relevant to understanding the
sources of competitive advantage include the in-
dustrial organisation model of competitive advan-
tage focusing on industry (e.g. Porter, 1980; 1985)
and the resource-based model of competitive ad-
vantage focusing on firm-specific factors (e.g.
Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991; 2001). Studies
from these literatures suggest that both firm-spe-
cific and industry effects have a role in explaining
value creation. However, firm-specific effects
dominate industry-specific effects (Rumelt, 1991).
According to Barney (1991) value is created from
firm-specific endowments when they are valuable,
rare, inimitable and difficult to substitute.
Early research focused primarily on financial 
information to study competitive advantage.
However, some researchers believe that the strate-
gic activities that generate (or destroy) value are
not formally captured in the traditional categories
of financial information. This has motivated re-
searchers to expand their efforts beyond a finan-
cial focus to study strategic sources of competitive
advantage. The evidence reviewed in this section
suggests that investors refer to a range of GAAP
and non-GAAP information relating to the firm’s
capabilities and strategy to value the firm’s stock.
This literature identifies a range of competencies
that are possible omitted variables from value-
relevance studies.
3.4.1. Competitive advantage – management 
reported assets
Consistent with a greater emphasis on non-
financial measures of the firm’s intangible value
since the mid-1990s, some managers have em-
braced a broader strategic focus on how their firm
creates value. This involves identifying, measur-
ing and managing the value drivers of customer
value, organisational innovation, and shareholder
wealth (Ittner and Larcker, 2001). Measurement
techniques range from unstructured checklists of
diverse financial and non-financial measures to
structured methods such as the balanced score-
card, economic value measurement (EVA, resid-
ual income or abnormal income), causal business
modelling, and environmental uncertainty mod-
els.
Proponents of the unstructured checklist of
measures argue that using diverse sets of financial
and non-financial measures decreases the risk that
managers fail to consider relevant dimensions of
their firm’s performance (Lingle and Schiemann,
1996). Proponents of the structured methods argue
that these techniques are useful for identifying suc-
cesses and failures relating to the firm’s strategy
and its fit with the organisation’s objectives
(Simons, 1991; Stewart, 1991; Stern et al., 1995;
Gates, 1999; Kaplan and Norton, 1992; 1996;
2001). Structured performance measurement is
predicated on the theory that performance meas-
ures must be aligned with and contingent on the
firm’s strategy and value drivers to be useful in
promoting value creation (e.g. Langfield-Smith,
1997).
Campbell et al. (2002) test and find evidence
consistent with the proposition that the balanced
Vol. 38 No. 3 2008 International Accounting Policy Forum. 235
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scorecard technique can be used to identify prob-
lems and highlight causes and solutions relating to
the firm’s operating strategy. However, their
analysis, using data from a convenience store
chain, suggests that this result only holds if the
analysis is conditioned on the firm’s competencies
(i.e. takes into account the fit between the strategy
and the skills of the workforce). Their analysis re-
veals that a poor fit between strategy and employ-
ee capabilities caused the convenience store
chain’s strategy to be ineffective.
By contrast, Biddle et al. (1997) find traditional
accounting measures are more value-relevant than
the structured economic value added measures. In
the financial services industry, Ittner et al. (2003)
find that the structured measurement approaches,
the balanced scorecard, economic value measure-
ment, and causal business modelling are associat-
ed with higher measurement system satisfaction
by users within the firm. But these three approach-
es are not associated with higher accounting or
stock price performance. Instead they find the
firms using an unstructured approach, comprising
a wide variety of financial and non-financial input
and output measures, earn higher stock returns
compared with firms with similar strategies or
value drivers that do not use the unstructured ap-
proach.
In summary, there is mixed evidence on the
value-relevance of unstructured and structured
methods of measuring value added. It is possible
this is partly due to omitted conditioning variables,
such as the firm’s competencies (Campbell et al.,
2002). Another question is how well the methods
capture the firm’s value-creating processes.
Aligned to this is a lack of data on the measures
that are actually used by managers and purpose or
objective of the measures (Ittner and Larcker,
2001). The lack of data is due to the proprietary
nature of this type of data, along with the diversi-
ty of competencies and strategies in use, which
makes it difficult for researchers to obtain robust
results.
3.4.2. Competitive advantage – researcher 
estimated assets
Gjerde et al. (2007) examine the value-relevance
of three sources of competitive advantage: indus-
try-based competitive advantage and two firm-
specific, resources-based competitive advantages
relating to profitability and risk. Using abnormal
stock returns as the valuation variable, and show-
ing consistency with other studies, Gjerde et al.
(2007) find the firm-specific advantage is three to
four times more value-relevant than the industry
specific advantage. Further, they find these two ef-
fects are interdependent.
3.4.3. Competitive advantage – annual 
expenditures
Spending that leads to information technology
(IT) capabilities has been linked to firm value al-
though with mixed results. Dewan and Min (1997)
provide evidence that IT capital is a net substitute
for both physical capital and labour in all sectors
of the economy using a Computerworld survey of
spending by US companies on information sys-
tems from 1988 to 1992. Earlier, Brynjolfsson
(1993) and Wilson (1993) could not find evidence
that IT contributed to firm productivity. Their 
results were rationalised by higher productivity
losing out to lower entry barriers, industry 
inefficiencies and competition (Hitt and
Bryjolfsson, 1996). However, later studies using
firm-level data suggest that IT capabilities are re-
lated to positive investment returns (Lichtenberg,
1995; Hitt and Brynjolfsson, 1996) and to the stock
price-based measures (Bharadwaj et al., 1999;
Brynjolfsson et al., 2002). Anderson et al. (2006)
employ financial data from the Y2K spending in
IT, in contrast to the prior studies, which primarily
use survey data. They find opportunistic improve-
ments in the firms’ IT capabilities (costs were bun-
dled with the Y2K spending) are associated with
higher contemporaneous stock price and higher fu-
ture profits. What is unclear in this literature is the
impact of omitted correlated intangibles, i.e. many
sources of intangible value go unrecognised under
GAAP.
3.4.4. Competitive advantage – input metrics
Darby et al. (1999) test the value-relevance of
the input measure, ties to star scientists, for
biotechnology firms. Darby et al. (1999) argue that
ties to star scientists is valued by investors due to
the investors’ ability to observe related indicators
of the firm’s intellectual human capital, such as the
number of scientists, how many have PhD degrees,
where they did their graduate work, and the size of
the firm’s R&D. They develop a valuation equa-
tion based on an option-pricing model that embeds
a dynamic jump process. This jump process in-
volves changes in the firm’s assets and value
whenever the intellectual human capital, in this
case the ties to star scientists, generate technologi-
cal successes. They find that increases in the ties to
star scientists metric is associated with higher
market valuation of the firm but at a decreasing
rate. For the average firm (relative to industry),
there is a 7.3%, or $16m increase, in the market
value of a firm per scholarly article written by, or
with, a star scientist compared with a firm with no
articles in academic journals.
Amir and Lev (1996) study industry-specific
measures of the firms’ value drivers for the wire-
less communications industry. In contrast to other
studies, they find the earnings and book value of
236 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
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shareholders’ equity, the two summary measures
of the firm’s financial performance and position
are not value-relevant. However, non-financial
input metrics are highly value-relevant for this in-
dustry, including a proxy for the firm’s expected
growth, the population of potential subscribers,
and a proxy for the firm’s expected operating per-
formance, the penetration ratio of subscribers to
the population of potential subscribers.
Klock and Megna (2000) similarly find that the
input metrics, radio spectrum licenses and the
firm’s potential customer base, are incrementally
value-relevant over advertising and R&D expendi-
tures for firms in the wireless telecommunications
industry. In fact, they report that the spectrum li-
cense explains over 60% of their market value of
equity measure, the Tobin’s q. Tobin’s q is the mar-
ket valuation of the firm’s financial claims divided
by an estimate of the replacement cost of the as-
sets.
Ethiraj et al. (2005) study the sources of com-
petitive advantage for a large Indian software com-
pany with about 90% of revenues from exports.
Their dataset includes information on revenues,
cost, factor inputs, capability measures, various
project characteristics, such as size, client industry,
and development platform, all measured at the
project level. Ethiraj et al. test and find that two
sets of firm-specific capabilities are important
sources of competitive advantage for firms in the
software development industry: client specific ca-
pabilities and project management capabilities.
Using non-financial and financial measures, they
find that the firms develop these capabilities
through learning-by-doing as well as sustained in-
vestment. Further, the two types of capabilities
contribute heterogeneously to value creation. That
is, the two capabilities are present in different pro-
portions across the software firm’s projects, cost
different amounts of money and provide different
levels of benefits. If capabilities such as these in-
teract with investment to impact firm value, then
value-relevance tests might need to understand
key capabilities to generate valid models.
The value-relevant non-financial information set
relating to competitive advantage and future
prospects changes over time. Stephan et al. (2007)
compare the changing value-relevant information
set for firms in the biotechnology industry over
two financing windows, 1989–1992 and
1996–2000. In the earlier period, 1989–1992,
biotechnology firms going public for the first time
(IPOs) comprised IP and research capabilities but
few marketable products. The likelihood of suc-
cess was a function of the number of products in
clinical trials, the reputation of underwriters, intel-
lectual property, alliances, and linkages with uni-
versity-affiliated scientists who won a Nobel
Prize.
In the later period – 1996–2000, biotechnology
industry was more established, now comprising a
large stock of IP, as well as research alliances, and
products in clinical testing. Stephan et al. (2007)
find the most striking difference between the two
time periods relates to the value attached to the
firm’s association with a Nobel laureate. This
value fell from $20.4m in the 1989–1992 period,
when there was little other information to signal
the firm’s prospects, to zero in the later 1996–2000
period.
In summary, the sources of firm-specific com-
petitive advantage canvassed in Section 3.4.4 refer
to the firm’s industry, technology, and business
model. This is consistent with the Gjerde et al.
(2007) evidence that firm-specific and industry
sources of competitive advantage are interdepend-
ent. The factors reviewed in this section appear to
be robustly value-relevant, consistent with core
value driver status. The discussion in this section
highlights the importance of identifying core value
drivers to ensure that all important sources of
value are included in the tests.
3.4.5. Competitive advantage – output metrics
Researchers have studied the contribution of
brands to firm value using non-financial output
metrics from surveys of customers. While finan-
cial measures of brands are usually value-relevant,
as discussed earlier, the evidence from these qual-
itative measures is not so convincing. For exam-
ple, Mizik and Jacobson (2006) investigate
whether five qualitative attributes of brands – 
energy, differentiation, relevance, esteem, and
knowledge – are value-relevant. Their constructs
and measures come from the Young and Rubicam
brand survey.24 Out of the five attributes, only en-
ergy (future ability to generate benefits) and rele-
vance (relevance of the brand to the customer) are
value-relevant. Interpreting this study is difficult.
For example, it is not clear whether Mizik and
Jacobson’s lack of results for three of the five
brand attributes is due to: (1) problems with the
five attributes (e.g. are these really the key factors
and are they sufficiently precise to be useful em-
pirically?); (2) problems with the customer re-
sponses (e.g. customers have different perceptions
of what the 50 questions are asking them); or (3)
problems with the way the five attributes are cre-
ated from the 50 survey questions.
Rajgopal et al. (2003) find competitive advan-
tage output metrics relating to network advantages
from website traffic are incrementally value-rele-
vant over earnings and the book value of share-
holders’ equity. They provide evidence that the
inputs that drive the network advantages are the
Vol. 38 No. 3 2008 International Accounting Policy Forum. 237
24 The Young and Rubicam brand asset valuator model is
discussed in Fudge (2005).
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firm’s affiliate referral program and media visibil-
ity. Rajgopal et al. (2003) also find the network ad-
vantage is positively associated with financial
analysts’ one- and two-year ahead earnings fore-
casts, providing further support for their value-rel-
evance results.
Hand (2000) employs a log-log linear regres-
sion, rather than the more common ordinary least
squares estimator, to examine the value-relevance
of web traffic metrics for internet companies in-
crementally to economic variables, including the
book value of shareholders’ equity, forecasted one-
year ahead earnings and forecasted long-run earn-
ings growth (and other supply and demand
variables). This type of regression describes a rela-
tionship of diminishing returns – i.e. increases in
web traffic at low levels (high levels) of web traf-
fic – are associated with large (much smaller) in-
creases in stock price. Hand (2000) finds the
economic variables dominate the web traffic out-
put metrics. Only the number of unique visitors to
the firm’s website metric is value-relevant. The
metrics that are not value-relevant include the
number of page views, hours at the website, and
average age and income of visitors. Hand’s (2000)
study suggests that econometric issues relating to
the dispersion of the data and the function used to
model the relations between web traffic metrics,
economic data, and firm value can impact the re-
sults.
Firm-specific information advantages arising
from networks have been linked to stock price.
Aral and Van Alstyne (2007) argue that the net-
work metrics are associated with stock price per-
formance because the networks provide access to
novel information. They find evidence consistent
with this proposition using output metrics for net-
work advantage, comprising a ten-month panel of
email communication patterns, message content,
and performance data from a medium-sized exec-
utive recruiting firm. They also find an upper limit
on network benefits arising from diminishing mar-
ginal productivity returns to novel information,
consistent with theories of bounded rationality,
and cognitive and information overload.
Aral and Weill (2007) provide evidence that the
prior mixed results relating to the benefits from IT
capabilities are due to omitting strategy from the
analysis. They argue that investments in different
IT assets are guided by the firms’ strategies (e.g.
cost leadership or innovation). That is, the IT as-
sets deliver value along dimensions consistent
with the underlying strategy. To provide insights
on this hypothesis, they test the association of IT
assets, IT capabilities, and strategy inputs, with
four dimensions of performance: market valuation,
profitability, cost, and innovation. Aral and Weill’s
(2007) results suggest that the financial investment
in IT is not value-relevant. However, the combina-
tion of IT investment and IT capabilities drives
differences in firm performance and is value-rele-
vant.
In summary, non-financial brand measures of
brands appear on the strength of the results in this
section to be less reliably measured compared with
the financial measures used by Barth et al. (1998)
discussed earlier. The studies in this section sug-
gest that other information is important, in addi-
tion to the financial information, for understanding
the contribution of financial information to per-
formance and value. Further, the non-information
interacts with the financial information rather than
entering the model additively. For example, not
conditioning the IT investment on the firm’s IT ca-
pabilities and strategy provides an incomplete pic-
ture of the value generated by the IT investment
and capabilities. Two issues of importance for de-
signing and interpreting value-relevance studies
are therefore the heterogeneity of firm-specific ca-
pabilities and their interdependence with the firm’s
strategic choices (Barney, 1991; Rumelt, 1984;
Wernerfelt, 1984).
One final issue that relates generally to the com-
petitive advantage literature is the apparent lack of
a conceptual framework for the building blocks
and purposes of competitive processes. For exam-
ple, the broad approach (e.g. balanced scorecard)
seems more relevant to the purpose of strategy
evaluation than to the purpose of firm valuation.
This lack of structure may explain the proliferation
of studies, targeting a wide range of capabilities
and actions, which have been unable to generate
robust or generalisable evidence.
3.5. Human capital
Employees create value for the firm by applying
their intellectual inputs and manual efforts in the
workplace. Human capital assets are heteroge-
neous and therefore less predictable compared with
physical assets. However, investments in labour
assets appreciate rather than depreciate with time
(Webster, 1999). The incentive that this creates for
employers to invest in human capital is mitigated
by the employer’s inability to own employees and
variation in the employees’ commitment and relia-
bility. This puts some of the incentives for educa-
tion and training onto the employee.
There is a view that human capital is increasing
in importance as a factor of production because
new technologies are now more likely to be em-
bodied in intangibles and labour rather than solely
in fixed capital (Kendrick, 1972; Webster, 1999).
A number of studies suggest the increasing and
often specialised skill set required to participate in
some occupations leads to a division (partitioning)
of labour into periodic inputs (current expenses)
and long-term assets (e.g. Webster, 1998). This
trend suggests human capital is important for value
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creation, particularly in high-skilled sections.
Irrespective of property rights issues relating to
human capital, firms requiring skilled labour to
compete would be expected to have strong incen-
tives to invest in attraction, retention and motiva-
tion of their human capital.
3.5.1. Human capital – management reported 
assets
Despite anecdotal evidence that a proportion of
human capital is an asset, no attempt is made to
identify or report these items under GAAP.
There has been a long-running debate on the
question of whether to capitalise labour compensa-
tion costs as an intangible asset. One suggested ap-
proach, similar to capital lease accounting, is to
report the discounted present value of estimated
compensation costs as a non-current asset and a li-
ability (Lev and Schwartz, 1971). The idea is that
a going concern investing in plant, property and
equipment commits to future compensation costs
for the life of those assets. Expenditures on em-
ployees therefore reflect expected benefits and a li-
ability to make continuing payments. This idea has
not been adopted, and human capital assets are not
reported under GAAP.
3.5.2. Human capital – researcher estimated
asset
In a series of papers, Rosett (2001, 2003) pro-
vides evidence on the value-relevance, financial
policies, and equity risk implications of imple-
menting capitalisation of human capital. Rosett
(2001) computes a human capital liability from the
present value of expected compensation costs in
union labour contracts in the spirit of Lev and
Schwartz (1971). In an earlier working paper
(Rosett, 1997), he finds the corresponding human
capital asset is significantly positively associated
with the market value of equity. In Rosett (2001),
he finds the increase in leverage from the human
capital liability is positively associated with meas-
ures of the firm’s equity risk. Tests on industry sec-
tors suggest the asset/liability measures are crude
for R&D and knowledge intensive industries,
where the proportion of value generated from in-
tellectual inputs is greater (i.e. where the partition-
ing of labour on the basis of skill levels would be
greatest).
Rosett (2003) focuses on the equity investment
risk and corporate financial policy implication of
the firm’s liability for the human capital intangible
asset. Because labour is costly to adjust in the
short run, he argues that the firm has a fixed obli-
gation to pay cash to labour, creating an off-bal-
ance-sheet intangible liability similar to a lease.
This liability creates a form of financial leverage
risk he calls labour leverage risk (total employ-
ment deflated by the market value of equity) and
labour cost leverage (compensation costs deflated
by the market value of equity). He predicts and
finds the labour leverage measures are positively
correlated with equity investment risk, and nega-
tively correlated with leverage and dividend pay-
out consistent with managers taking human capital
risk into account when setting financing and divi-
dend policies.
Lajili and Zeghal (2006) construct human capi-
tal productivity (marginal product of labour esti-
mated from labour and training expenditures and
production function regressions) and an efficiency
indicator (marginal product of labour minus aver-
age industry labour costs) and relate these to stock
price performance. Risk-adjusted abnormal returns
are computed for portfolios sorted by size, labour-
cost disclosure status, and the human capital indi-
cators. They find higher levels of total labour
expenditures, workforce productivity, and efficien-
cy is generally associated with higher abnormal re-
turns. Hence, labour costs voluntarily disclosed in
financial statements are potentially useful for eval-
uating human capital assets and value.
Abdel-khalik (2003) constructs a measure of
managerial skills for executives on the Board of
Directors. He employs a latent index regression
that comprises a set of personal variables (experi-
ence, risk preference, and value of owned shares)
and a set of firm-specific variables (past profit and
growth, organisational complexity, and operating
risk). The predicted values from the latent variable
regression are the measure of managerial skill.
Abdel-khalik finds these predicted values are
value-relevant.
Disclosures relating to managements’ stock op-
tion incentives are a human capital-related invest-
ment that has been tested for value-relevance. For
example, Landsman et al. (2004) find the employ-
ee stock option (ESO) related costs are value-rele-
vant. However, Landsman et al. (2004) provide
evidence which suggests that only one of the four
accounting methods for equity-based incentives
results in accounting numbers that accurately re-
flect the dilution effects of ESOs on shareholder
value. This method involves the grant date recog-
nition of an asset and a liability and subsequent
marking-to-market of the liability. Landsman et al.
report that this method is the most value-relevant
of the four accounting methods. The other three
less value-relevant methods are non-recognition
(APB 25), recognition of only the stock option ex-
pense (SFAS 123), and recognition of only a stock
option asset – as in the FASB’s Exposure Draft:
Share Based Payment (2004).
Measurement of dilutive effects is an issue. Li
and Wong (2004) use a warrant-pricing model to
jointly allow for the dilutive and shareholder value
impact of employee stock options and use this in
equity valuation. They find the market value of eq-
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uity is overstated by 6% if the dilutive features of
stock options are ignored. A larger bias exists for
heavy users of stock options, small firms, and
R&D-intensive firms.
In summary, the evidence suggests human capi-
tal assets measured using contract and non-finan-
cial and financial input data are value-relevant.
Managers appear to take the (off-balance sheet) li-
abilities into account when setting financing and
dividend policies, and these liabilities are positive-
ly associated with equity risk. Investments in
human capital productivity and efficiency are also
value-relevant as are measures of managerial skills
and their stock option compensation (although the
measurement of stock options and dilutive effects
is difficult). An area requiring future research is
how to more precisely measure human capital as-
sets and liabilities to take skill level into account.
3.5.3. Human capital – annual expenditures
GAAP has a limited role in the reporting of
labour costs. Labour costs data is collected by
National Statistical Bureaus in their annual sur-
veys. Separate reporting of the expenditures paid
to employees is envisaged under IAS 1
Presentation of Financial Statements (paragraphs
86–95).25 Despite this expectation, there is no evi-
dence of widespread reporting of labour expendi-
tures under GAAP. Separate reporting of labour
expenditures is voluntary in the US. There is a re-
quirement to disclose employee costs and number
of employees under the UK Companies Act.26
Overall, the GAAP data on labour costs appears to
be limited.
In the US setting, Ballester et al. (2002) use a
more fully specified regression based on Ohlson
(1995), compared to Rosett’s (1997) working
paper discussed above, to examine the proportion
of US labour costs that are value-relevant.
Separate identification of labour costs in US finan-
cial statements is voluntary and they find only
about 10% of all US Compustat firms disclose
these costs. Of these disclosed costs, only about
16% are value-relevant, with an amortisation rate
of 34% per year. Possibly the human capital meas-
ures would yield more power in the tests if the
labour costs could be disaggregated to separate out
higher and lower specificity human capital assets
(e.g. skilled/unskilled or partitioning according to
scientist/engineer/management/sales).
In the spirit of the earlier discussion on the value
of skilled labour, Hansson (2004) predicts there is
a value premium associated with human capital
that distinguishes the stock performance of value
and glamour stocks. He finds that the dispersion in
wage growth between value and growth stocks ex-
plains a large proportion of the differences in stock
returns. The intuition for this result is that the
value stocks are less exposed to shocks in rents to
human capital. Hansson also finds that differences
in the labour force characteristics between value
and growth stocks are value-relevant.
Despite considerable corporate opposition, and
concerns about the reliability of fair value esti-
mates of stock option expense, accounting stan-
dards now require corporations to recognise
expenses relating to grants of stock options to em-
ployees – IFRS 2 Share-Based Payment and FASB
SFAS 123 (revised 2004). Equity-based compen-
sation is now measured at fair value on grant date,
based on the estimated number of awards expect-
ed to vest, and allocated as an expense over the
vesting period.
Frederickson, Hodge and Pratt (2006) conduct
an experiment to study how stock option expense
recognition affects the valuation decisions of so-
phisticated financial statement users. The subjects
are 220 business school alumni with an average of
11 years’ experience in financial analysis and 
16 years’ accounting-related work experience.
Seventy-nine percent are Certified Public
Accountants. An initial ex ante reliability assess-
ment by the subjects is updated based on four
questions relating to a comparison of stock option
expense earnings versus no expense earnings.
Frederickson et al. predict and find (1) users con-
sider stock option expense recognised under a
FASB mandate is more reliable than stock option
expense voluntarily recognised by management;
(2) users consider stock option expense voluntari-
ly recognised on the income statement is more re-
liable than stock option expense disclosed in the
footnotes; and (3) users invest more in a firm that
voluntarily recognises stock option expense than
in a firm that discloses the expense in the foot-
notes, even though voluntary recognition reduces
reported net income. The results of this study sug-
gest users perceive that stock option grants give
rise to expenses and impound this information in
firm value accordingly. Further, users behave as if
accounting regulation sets the ground rules for
credible disclosure, and recognition signals relia-
bility (as opposed to disclosure in the notes).
In summary, human capital measures computed
from labour costs are value-relevant. However, re-
searchers find these costs are only very sparsely
disclosed and the costs are not sufficiently disag-
gregated to provide precise measures of the human
capital assets. Behavioural research suggests ac-
counting regulation of stock options has created
240 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
25 Paragraph 91 labels these expenditures ‘employee bene-
fits’ which are defined in IAS 19 Employee Benefits to include
all benefits provided to employees in return for employee
services.
26 Thanks to Andy Stark for this information. The UK
Company Act where this provision was made can be viewed at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2006/ukpga_20060046_en_1,
paragraph 411.
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value for firms perceived to be appropriately and
transparently applying the standard.
3.5.4. Human capital – input metrics
Colombo and Grilli (2005) study how non-fi-
nancial input metrics of management quality relate
to growth. They examine whether education and
prior work experience are key capabilities of the
founders of technology companies that determine
differences in the firms’ growth. For a sample of
506 young Italian companies in manufacturing and
services, they find the years of university educa-
tion in economic and managerial fields, and to a
lesser extent in scientific and technical fields, are
positively related to growth but education in other
fields is not. Prior work experience in the same in-
dustry of the new firm is positively associated with
growth while prior work experience in other in-
dustries is not. Technical work experience of
founders rather than commercial work experience
determines growth. There are synergistic gains
from having complementary capabilities.
Several studies also report human capital man-
agement practices are related to higher firm per-
formance (e.g. Huselid, 1995; Ichniowski et al.,
1997; Hitt et al., 2001).
Some industries are largely determined by the
firm’s endowment of intellectual human capital
specific to the dominant technology. One of these
is biotechnology (Zucker et al., 1998). Hand
(2001) examines whether the human capital re-
flected in employees is value-relevant for biotech-
nology companies for whom skilled labour
comprising bioscientists and bioengineers is an
important factor of production. Because the rele-
vant expenditures on hiring, retaining and incen-
tivising employees are not separately reported
under GAAP, Hand (2001) employs proxies of
human capital inputs – the total number of em-
ployees – and the quality of human capital – the
ratio of SGA to the number of employees. It is pos-
sible these measures are not precise enough to be
value-relevant. For example, the number of em-
ployees is commonly used to measure firm size in
economic studies. Further, the number of employ-
ees includes all workers, not just the biotechnolo-
gy experts who generate the firm’s new science
and/or technology. The results are consistent with
this conjecture. Using a log-log model, neither of
these human capital measures are value-relevant.
Hand (2001) reports that the GAAP variables
(shareholders’ equity, retained earnings, treasury
stock, revenues, cost of sales, SGA, R&D, and
dividends) explain about 70% of stock price.
In summary, some studies employ non-financial
input measures of management skills and find they
are associated with differences in firm growth.
This is an important area for future research given
the lack of GAAP disclosures capable of providing
insights on the contribution of human capital in-
vestments to value.
3.5.5. Human capital – output metrics
Edmans (2007) finds a non-financial output
measure of employee satisfaction, the companies’
scores from the Best Companies to Work for in
America ranking, is associated with higher stock
price performance. This portfolio of firms also
outperformed industry, and characteristics
matched benchmarks.
Several studies find that output measures of the
firm’s reputation are value-relevant. The idea is
that reputation increases the probability that value-
relevant information is impounded into stock price
(Healy and Palepu, 1993). For example, Black 
et al. (1999) find reputation rankings based on
Fortune’s America’s Most Admired Companies is
positively significantly associated with the differ-
ence between the market and book value of equity.
Hutton and Stocken (2007) examine the effect of
firm reputation for forecast accuracy on investors’
reaction to managements’ earnings forecasts using
size-adjusted, three-day event window stock re-
turns centred on the earnings release and manage-
ment forecast. Their measure of forecasting
reputation reflects prior forecast accuracy and fre-
quency. They find that a forecasting reputation
makes investors more responsive to management
forecast news. A forecasting reputation leads to in-
vestors’ reaction at the management forecast date
largely pre-empting their earnings announcement
stock response. However, the results suggest that
all firms do not build a forecasting reputation be-
cause the cost outweighs the benefits when report-
ed earnings do not reach management’s forecast.
Using a field experiment that is co-linked to a
laboratory experiment, List (2006) finds subjects
drawn from a natural marketplace behave in ac-
cordance with social preference models in the lab-
oratory experiments. However, in their naturally
occurring market settings, their behaviour better
approximates self-interest. List finds the inci-
dences of socially orientated behaviours in the
marketplace are motivated by reputation concerns.
Fisher and Heinkel (2007) study management’s
motivation for truth-telling and reputation. In their
model, management builds reputation when times
are good and honesty is affordable, and exploits
reputation in times of need. However, competition
appears to constrain this potential managerial
agency problem. Relying on the US business com-
bination anti-takeover statutes passed between
1985 and 1991 to measure variation in corporate
governance states, Giroud and Mueller (2007) find
the loosening of corporate governance constraints
is associated with negative operating performance
and stock price effects only for firms in less com-
petitive industries. Product market competition
Vol. 38 No. 3 2008 International Accounting Policy Forum. 241
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thus appears to act as a brake on managerial
agency problems, consistent with the view of
Alchian (1950), Friedman (1953) and Stigler
(1958) that managerial slack cannot survive in
competitive industries.
In summary, output measures of employee satis-
faction and firm reputation are correlated with
value. Agency conflicts may negatively impact the
ex post propensity for management to act in accor-
dance with good reputation, although competition
may constrain this tendency. An area for future re-
search is input measures of reputation from the
previous section, as these are important for under-
standing the ‘causes’ of reputation.
3.6. Goodwill
There is a long-lived debate over the conceptual
underpinnings of goodwill and indeed whether
purchased goodwill is an asset. We have so far en-
countered a lot of literature in this paper that can
provide insights on whether or not a firm has valu-
able goodwill. It seems much more fruitful to look
at the earnings and value implications of specific
and identifiable drivers of value.
3.6.1. Goodwill – management reported assets
GAAP-purchased goodwill is the difference be-
tween the acquisition price of a business or com-
pany and the fair value of the identifiable net
assets acquired by the acquiring entity (IFRS 3
Business Combinations). Most studies find GAAP
goodwill is value-relevant (e.g. Chauvin and
Hirschey, 1994; McCarthy and Schneider, 1996;
Vincent, 1994; Muller, 1994; Jennings, Robinson,
Thompson and Duvall, 1996). Vincent (1994)
finds the value-relevance relation holds for up to
five years after the acquisition of goodwill.
Chauvin and Hirschey (1994) examine the
value-relevance of financial information on intan-
gibles for a sample of US companies in
1989–1991. They find GAAP goodwill, net in-
come, advertising, R&D, intangible assets, and
tangible assets are value-relevant for non-manu-
facturing companies. These variables are all value-
relevant for manufacturers, except for the goodwill
and intangible assets, possibly because more of the
manufacturers’ intangible assets are embodied in
plant and equipment (Hansen and Serin, 1997).
Goodwill is less value-relevant compared with the
other intangible assets, suggesting goodwill is less
reliably measured. Muller (1994) also finds evi-
dence consistent with this conclusion.
Amir et al. (1993) and Barth and Clinch (1995)
examine the value-relevance of the goodwill ad-
justment from the reconciliation of UK and
Australian GAAP to US GAAP. Both studies find
the goodwill adjustment is value-relevant. The UK
firms predominantly wrote off all goodwill to
shareholders’ equity prior to 1996. Hence, the
goodwill adjustment is the entire goodwill asset
that would have been recorded without the write-
off to equity. In a separate analysis for the UK
firms, Barth and Clinch (1995) find this goodwill
adjustment is value-relevant but less so than the
other assets.27
Goodwill amortisation is not value-relevant
(Amir et al., 1993; Vincent, 1994; Muller, 1994;
Jennings et al., 1995; Barth and Clinch, 1995).
Clinch (1995) suggests this may reflect a percep-
tion that some firms’ goodwill is not declining in
value. It is also conceivable that the useful life
cannot be estimated (by managers or investors)
and/or that the Henning et al. (2000) over-valua-
tion component (discussed in Section 3.6.2.) dis-
torts the amortisation charge.
Amortisation is now prohibited under interna-
tional accounting standards and in other jurisdic-
tions. Chambers (2007) examines whether the
change from amortisation of goodwill to an annu-
al impairment test under the US standard, SFAS
No. 142 Goodwill and Intangible Assets, increased
the reliability of goodwill and its value-relevance.
He finds the annual impairment testing is associat-
ed with an increase in value-relevance. However,
information appears to be lost as a result of the
elimination of systematic amortisation, which is
surprising given most studies find amortisation
charges are not value-relevant. Possibly, the im-
pairment loss is understated, and this is an omitted
variable being picked up in the tests as a decrease
in value-relevance that coincides with the cessa-
tion of amortisation.
Consistent with this conjecture, Hayn and
Hughes (2006) find goodwill write-offs lag behind
the economic impairment of goodwill by an aver-
age of three to four years. For one-third of their
sample, the delay can extend up to ten years. They
find their results for the period prior to the intro-
duction of SFAS No. 142 are also generalisable to
the goodwill reported under SFAS No. 142.
Ramanna and Watts (2007) corroborate this evi-
dence for a sample of firms with indications of 
impairment. The frequency of no goodwill impair-
ment in their sample is about 71%. The propensity
not to impair is associated with financial charac-
teristics that relate to higher management discre-
tion from the unverifiable fair-value measures. The
evidence therefore suggests that GAAP goodwill
under the impairment test regime is value-relevant
but not reliably measured.
In summary, purchased goodwill is value-rele-
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aggregate an accounting measure like book value of equity
into separate components, a significant association with stock
price does not necessarily mean the market finds the compo-
nent is value-relevant. The correct test, they argue, compares
the coefficients of the component variables and the remaining
book value after the decomposition.
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vant but less so than tangible assets and does not
appear to be reliably measured. This conclusion is
consistent with the concepts of relevance and reli-
ability, and their roles in value-relevance tests, as
discussed in Section 2.3 and illustrated in Figure 1.
3.6.2. Goodwill – researcher estimated asset
One explanation for the lower value-relevance
of goodwill compared with other intangible assets
is that it is over-valued on average, on the balance
sheet, relative to investor expectations. Consistent
with this idea, Henning, Lewis and Shaw (2000)
find an over-valuation component which is nega-
tively associated with stock price. They examine
the value-relevance of four components of good-
will: (1) write-up of target firm assets to market
value; (2) going-concern value of the target; (3)
synergy value created by the acquisition; and (4)
over-valuation component. Consistent with the
conclusion from the previous section that goodwill
is not reliably measured, only the first three com-
ponents are value-relevant, with the going concern
component dominating. Arguably, the synergy
component is also difficult to value, and its relia-
bility varies.
3.6.3. Goodwill – annual expenditures, input 
metrics and output metrics
Annual expenditures that relate to the firm’s
goodwill are not identified under GAAP standards.
Measuring unrecorded intangible assets and their
implications for firm value was one of the motiva-
tions for investment opportunity set (IOS) studies.
Smith and Watts (1992), Skinner (1993) and Gaver
and Gaver (1993) use various proxies for the
firms’ IOS and report that the IOS helps explain
the firms’ accounting-based debt, dividend and
management compensation policy decisions.
Disaggregating the IOS and identifying and
measuring constituent components is necessary to
gain further insights, and the literature reviewed in
this paper demonstrates the innovative ways that
researchers have tackled this problem. Along these
lines, Falk and Gordon (1977) proposed that good-
will be defined as the total value of favourable
market imperfections and related government reg-
ulations, with purchased goodwill representing the
amount one firm pays another firm for the sum of
these assets. Their empirical work identifies 21
categories of sources of goodwill under four
groupings: imperfections in financial markets,
labour markets, product markets, and government
regulations. For example, labour market imperfec-
tions relate to managerial talent, good labour rela-
tions, training programs, and organisational
structure of the acquired firm. They point out that
goodwill is unobservable, and it is therefore easier
to think about sources and measures directly.
4. Conclusions and future research
At the 1996 SEC Symposium on Financial
Reporting and Intangible Assets, Stiglitz (1996)
discussed the importance of accounting (and audit-
ing) for the workings of a capitalist society and
markets, and the informational limitations of data
from the accounting system, in fact data from any
measurement system. He noted that while there is
going to be a higher uncertainty associated with
valuing intangible assets than other assets, it is a
source of major distortion to incentive systems to
value intangibles at zero (1996: 17–19).
The main thrust of the value-relevance studies
reviewed in this paper is consistent with the views
expressed by Stiglitz (1996). There is a strong per-
ception permeating the literature that learning
about the firm’s investments in intangibles is im-
portant for understanding how firms create (or de-
stroy) value. This is consistent with the economics
of intangible investments as a key input to the pro-
duction function.
This study compiles a somewhat voluminous re-
view of a wide cross-section of studies on intangi-
bles information. Such a wide-ranging approach is
motivated by the difficulty of judging whether
value-relevance is due to relevance or reliability
and the difficulty of obtaining direct tests of relia-
bility.
4.1. Main findings
Table 1 summarises the main findings from the
literature review. The studies are grouped based on
the category of intangibles, the measurement ap-
proach, and the value-relevance measure: stock
price level, stock returns or financial performance.
The measurement categories reflect (1) the eco-
nomics of the value creation processes and the re-
searcher and practitioners’ interests in the
identification of value drivers and their empirical
measures; (2) the influence of GAAP on the re-
porting of intangibles and the research problems of
interest to practitioners and researchers; and (3)
the influence of management discretion.
The subtotals show that the literature is concen-
trated in the R&D and IP category. Within this cat-
egory, the research is concentrated in the annual
R&D outlay and the output metrics measurement
areas. The least work in the R&D and IP area has
been done in the input metrics area, for which
there is limited data. What goes in R&D is not dis-
closed; therefore, it is difficult to know what input
metrics would be relevant. The annual outlay 
emphasis reflects the effect of GAAP, which re-
quires most R&D to be immediately expensed.
The output metric emphasis reflects the interest of
researchers and practitioners in alternative, non-
accounting ways of measuring the success rate of
R&D inputs. It is often argued that the success rate
information is there in the form of earnings.
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However, it is not always feasible to wait until
earnings. Further, earnings is an output that is not
informative about how the value was (or is expect-
ed to be) created.
Stock price levels studies dominate the R&D
and IP category. Comparing the significance and
totals columns for the R&D and IP category, the
information on intangibles always has significant
coefficients for the stock level studies. For the
stock levels tests, the coefficients on the R&D and
IP category intangibles tend to be larger than the
other assets in the regression. This result is not
what one would expect to find. This is an issue for
future research: to try to design studies that pro-
vide insights on the extent to which this result is
due to higher value-relevance versus measurement
and research design issues (e.g. omitted variables).
The R&D and IP stock returns studies are con-
centrated in the management reported and re-
searcher estimated assets areas. The estimated
coefficients are not always significant for the stock
returns studies. One explanation is that the stock
returns window, which is typically annual, is not
wide enough to capture value-relevant information
in the management reported and researcher esti-
mated R&D assets. Both these types of R&D as-
sets are also subject to potentially significant
economic uncertainty relating to the success rate.
Consistent with this effect, the existing literature
indicates that a dollar of R&D is valued different-
ly across time periods, industries and technologies.
It would help investors if the causes of this varia-
tion could be identified. There are opportunities to
study the rate that R&D contributes to value and
the cause of changes in the success rate by focus-
ing on stock return windows in which there is a
shock, such as a significant invention (e.g. an im-
portant drug that trials successfully). Providing
systematic evidence on these phenomena will help
to distinguish real effects in value-relevance tests
from distortions due to research design issues.
For the brands and advertising category, the
main focus is the output metrics which are the
more readily available data. Output metrics relate
to an important area of value creation, including
constructs such as the long-term customer base
value and customer retention. There is much less
research in the researcher estimated assets and
input metrics areas, presumably because GAAP
rules do not require the reporting of brands and ad-
vertising. Also, the advertising expenditures might
be viewed as proprietary information by managers.
In terms of value-relevance metrics, the stock
price levels studies dominate the brands and ad-
vertising area and the estimated coefficients on in-
tangibles in these studies are all significant. For
the output metrics studies, the coefficients on in-
tangibles items tend to be less that the other assets
in the tests, but not for the management reported
brand and advertising assets, which raises the issue
for future research of management reporting in-
centives and/or research design issues.
For the customer loyalty category, output met-
rics dominate. The output metric coefficients are
all significant and the coefficients tend to be larg-
er than those on the other assets in the regression.
This is consistent with the importance of cus-
tomers to a successful business but could also be
due to measurement error or omitted variables.
Customer loyalty is an area where there is limited
financial accounting data. There is a demand for
studies that can provide insights into accounting
regulators on the types of financial information re-
lating to customer loyalty that are value-relevant.
This type of research requires access to what is
currently proprietary financial data. Understanding
how customer loyalty is generated and destroyed
in different industries is a pre-requisite for identi-
fying value-relevant information on customer loy-
alty.
For the competitive advantage category, there is
limited research in the management reported and
researcher estimated assets areas. Not all the coef-
ficients are significant for the management report-
ed assets link to financial performance. The
competitive advantage studies are concentrated in
the annual outlay, input and output metrics cate-
gories. But the most work is in the input metrics
area. The competitive advantage studies are domi-
nated by stock level and even more so by financial
performance studies. The coefficients are all sig-
nificant and tend to be larger than the coefficients
for other assets in the regression. This indicates
that either the competitive advantage factors are
vitally important or there is measurement error or
omitted variables. The competitive advantage lit-
erature is one area that would benefit from a gen-
eral theory that defines and articulates the relevant
value constructs, value creation processes and em-
pirical measures. Such a framework is needed to
increase the logical validity and reliability of the
body of evidence and the generalisability of the re-
sults.
The human capital category of intangibles has
no management reported assets, reflecting the im-
pact of GAAP. The stock price studies are spread
across the remaining four measurement categories,
while the financial performance studies are con-
centrated in the input metrics area. The coeffi-
cients are always significant for the human capital
information. The coefficients tend to be smaller
than other assets in the regression for the stock lev-
els but not for the stock returns and financial per-
formance tests. This result suggests human capital
levels and changes are both important to firms.
The inference is that the human capital contribu-
tion to value can change in short time periods.
Omitted variables are also a possible cause of the
244 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
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larger coefficients for the returns and financial per-
formance tests. However, this result is consistent
with the theory in this area. There are opportunities
to design studies that can help accounting regula-
tors to understand what financial data on human
capital is value-relevant. Studies of this type
would need access to what is currently proprietary
data.
The goodwill section is fully concentrated in the
management reported assets, reflecting GAAP,
and in the stock level studies for reasons which are
not clear. There are thus opportunities to study
stock return and financial performance implica-
tions of purchased goodwill. In particular, does
purchased goodwill contribute to future perform-
ance and when? Is the purchased goodwill relation
with stock returns and financial performance
changing over time and how rapidly? There are
new research opportunities in the goodwill area
arising from the major change in GAAP from
amortisation to an annual impairment test, particu-
larly arising from the evidence so far that the pur-
chased goodwill balance is overstated on average.
4.2. Evidence on the reliability of financial and
non-financial information
The studies reviewed in this paper taken togeth-
er suggest the expenditures on R&D and pur-
chased goodwill are value-relevant but are not
reliable indicators of the future benefits from the
investments. For R&D, management knows what
expenditures are bundled into R&D and how these
expenditures are expected to create value (refer to
the value construct-to-value creation link in 
Figure 1). However, this information is not reli-
ably reflected in the R&D measure partly because
R&D bundles successful and unsuccessful efforts,
and also because GAAP R&D bundles different,
undisclosed types of expenditures that have differ-
ent links to the generation of future benefits. For
purchased goodwill, the link between the goodwill
value construct and value creation is weak (see
Figure 1). This lack of definition means that the
accounting measure of goodwill cannot be reliable
(see Figure 1 and Henning et al., 2000, in Section
3.6.2). Hence, the goodwill measure is relevant but
varies in its reliability, a conclusion which is borne
out by the empirical evidence (see Section 3.6).
The evidence reviewed in this paper indicates that
there is little point trying to evaluate the value im-
plications of R&D by focusing only on the number
of R&D dollars spent. Section 3.1 refers to a range
of factors that are relevant for evaluating R&D. To
date, Henning et al. (2000) is the only known study
to suggest how to empirically evaluate the value-
relevant and reliable components of purchased
goodwill.
It is difficult to make categorical statements
about the reliability of most of the other informa-
tion items in this paper that researchers have stud-
ied. In most cases, differences in value-relevance
could be due to differences in relevance, in relia-
bility or differences in both relevance and reliabil-
ity. What makes it a bit easier to make this
judgment for R&D is the triangulation by Healy et
al. (2002) and Kothari et al. (2002), using designs
that provide an economic benchmark with a known
value against which the R&D can be evaluated.
Further, economic theory indicates that R&D is 
inherently uncertain, providing a strong a priori
case for the unreliability of R&D as a predictor of
future rents.
Given reliable measurement is important to ac-
counting regulators and those users relying on fi-
nancial accounting information, designing studies
to obtain direct tests of reliability is an important
area for future research. One approach is to focus
on settings where the value of intangibles is known
to be changing and employ stock returns to test for
value-relevance. Another area for future research
is to identify economic benchmarks other than
stock price for the realisability of the expected fu-
ture benefits from intangibles, and incorporate
these benchmarks into the value-relevance tests to
provide direct insights on reliability. For example,
Healy et al. (2002) simulate a known firm value
which serves as a value-relevance benchmark.
Another example is the Matolcsy and Wyatt
(2008) study, which examines the value-relevance
of current earnings in the context of three different
types of technology conditions that are economic
benchmarks for expected growth and property
rights effects.
4.3. Research design issues
The studies canvassed in this paper also suggest
a range of factors that are potentially omitted vari-
ables in value-relevance studies. Further, the fi-
nancial information links to stock price often vary
interactively (and hence non-linearly) with factors
such as the firm’s resource endowments and strate-
gic choices. In some circumstances, the relation
between the information item of interest and stock
price is increasing (or decreasing) but at a declin-
ing rate, a functional form which may be accom-
modated by a non-linear function. Non-linearities
can arise from life-cycle effects, firm specific ef-
fects arising from the specialised nature of each
firm’s production function, firms reporting losses
versus profits, and the differing persistence of
earnings components (Das and Lev, 1994;
Subramanyam, 1996; Lipe et al., 1998; Call et al.,
2007). Thompson et al. (2001), provide an eco-
nomic justification for using a log-linear form to
estimate stock value based on accounting informa-
tion. These model specification issues can be at
least partly addressed if researchers carefully artic-
ulate the relevance and reliability links that are 
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illustrated in Figure 1.
Some empirical measures appear to have a large
amount of measurement error (Boyd et al., 2004).
Examples include non-financial measures of cus-
tomer satisfaction, brands and human capital that
rely on informal survey data, subjective conceptu-
al frameworks, and potentially imprecise, blunt
measures such as the number of employees. Where
possible, measuring actual inputs and actual value
created is preferable to measuring only the percep-
tions of these quantities obtained from surveys.
4.4. Trading-off management discretion and 
regulation
An issue for future research is the costs and ben-
efits of management discretion to voluntarily re-
port intangible assets versus regulation. More
financial reporting discretion gives managers the
opportunity to report their firm’s economic reality.
However, agency conflicts can arise between
stakeholders and managers. Financial reporting
may be overly optimistic or in the worst case sce-
nario, misleading. Further, voluntary reporting
without a standardising reporting framework for
intangibles adversely impacts the interpretability
of the resulting information. The adverse effects of
no regulation is evident from the history of ‘intan-
gible capital’ reporting which so far has a bewil-
dering range of measures but no conceptual
framework or clear purpose(s) of measurement
(Hunter et al., 2005). Regulation can have eco-
nomic consequences if the regulations prevent
managers reporting the firm’s economic reality
(Anderson and Zimmer, 1992). Regulation can
provide benefits. For example, there is evidence
that investors perceive the regulated stock option
compensation reporting is more reliable than the
unregulated stock option reporting (Section 3.5.3).
There is evidence from the Australian setting
that management discretion to report intangible as-
sets is associated with the financial reporting of
value-relevant identifiable intangible assets.
Acquired and internally generated intangibles (but
not basic research) could be reported in the
Australian setting until the adoption of IFRS in
2005. The evidence suggests the most discre-
tionary items (the least regulated intangibles) are
the most value-relevant, which suggests that dis-
cretion is associated with a balance of relevance
and reliability (Wyatt, 2005). Wyatt finds that
R&D assets and purchased goodwill are not value-
relevant in this setting, where investors know that
managers have discretion to report identifiable in-
tangible assets that are more informative about the
source of future benefits.
Contrast these results with the evidence (Section
3.1 and 3.6) that R&D expenditures and purchased
goodwill are value-relevant in countries where
management has limited discretion to report more
precise indicators of future benefits. For example,
the expected source of benefits from brands and li-
cences relates to market power and the source of
expected benefits from patents and trademarks are
monopolies over a specific invention or mark. But
how will purchased goodwill benefit the acquirer?
Would this goodwill be value-relevant if managers
had more accounting discretion to report on intan-
gibles?
What if regulators give firms discretion to report
intangible assets on the balance sheet constrained
only by the definition and recognition criteria for
assets and the statutory audit? The Australian ex-
perience prior to the IFRS adoption in 2005 sug-
gests that market efficiency might continue as
before. In the Australian setting, the recognised in-
tangible assets that are the least regulated are the
assets that are associated with the firms’ underly-
ing economic reality (Wyatt, 2005); recognised in-
tangible assets are associated with the generation
of future earnings (Ritter and Wells, 2005); finan-
cial analyst following is higher, and earnings fore-
cast errors are lower for firms that recognise
intangible assets and have growth opportunities
but not for the extremely high or low growth op-
portunities firms (Matolcsy and Wyatt, 2007). This
evidence does not suggest that discretion to report
intangibles seriously impacts market efficiency.
Does the asymmetric treatment of acquired and
internally generated intangible assets achieve the
desired aim of increasing the reliability of report-
ed intangibles? The international standard, IAS 38
Intangible Assets assumes acquired intangibles are
the most relevant and reliable measures due to 
a market transaction. However, the conceptual 
discussion summarised in Figure 1 suggests rele-
vance and reliability are determined jointly, not by
mode of acquisition, but by the level of definition
of the value construct and value creation process,
and the ability of the accounting measure to reflect
expectations about value creation. This conceptu-
alisation (discussed in Section 2.3) and the empir-
ical evidence (Sections 3.1 and 3.6) suggest the
acquired goodwill and the internal R&D are not re-
liable indicators of future benefits. Reliability is
important when payoffs are specified in terms of
accounting numbers (e.g. the measure of earnings
available for distribution to shareholders as divi-
dends). This is one reason for the pervasiveness of
accounting conservatism. What, if any, are the eco-
nomic consequences of recording these unreliable
assets? How much discretion do managers have in
applying these asymmetric rules? What affects
their judgment in implementing the IAS 38 asym-
metric standards?
Some studies suggest recognition in the finan-
cial statements is a more reliable signal compared
with the alternative of disclosing in the notes to the
accounts (e.g. Ahmed et al., 2006). Consistent with
246 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
s D
ian
 N
us
wa
nto
ro
], 
[R
iri
h D
ian
 Pr
ati
wi
 SE
 M
si]
 at
 20
:43
 29
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
13
 
this idea, external auditors appear to permit more
misstatement in footnotes compared with recog-
nised amounts (Libby et al., 2006). There are op-
portunities to exploit the differences in GAAP
across countries to obtain insights on the effects of
accounting conservatism, and recognition versus
disclosure, on the value-relevance of financial in-
formation relating to intangibles.
Barth et al. (2003) find that recognition of a
highly unreliable accounting amount, rather than
disclosure, increases the information in stock price
if the recognised amount is relevant information.
From Figure 1, when information is relevant the
manner of value creation is reasonably well de-
fined and the lack of reliability relates to the in-
ability of the measure (e.g. R&D asset) to
precisely reflect the expected value creation. Their
study suggests that because of the imprecision ef-
fects of aggregation (e.g. bundling expenditures to
obtain an R&D number) that basing recognition
decisions on reliability alone is too simplistic.
Reliability relative to relevance is the key, not re-
liability on its own. The evidence reviewed in this
paper is consistent with the Barth et al. (2003)
findings in the sense that the information on intan-
gibles is value-relevant in spite of the obvious
problems with reliable measurement.
4.5. Regulatory implications
The general problem of incomplete information
discussed in Section 2 suggests that more informa-
tion is better even if it is uncertain. Accounting
regulators have gone the other way, increasingly
moving to prevent firms measuring and reporting
internally generated intangible assets. However,
even unreliable numbers can be useful signals that
(unobservable) assets exist, pointing investors in
the direction of additional relevant information
sources. For example, a patent measured and
recorded at £1 on the balance sheet is informative
if it signals the existence of a patent for which de-
tailed information is publicly available to anyone
who cares to search the public patent office online
databases.
One gap in financial reporting that is evident
from the review in this paper is the reporting of
separate line items of expenditures on intangibles
in the income statement. The review suggests there
are deficiencies in reporting labour expenditures,
advertising and marketing, the components of
R&D, and expenditures relating to the generation
of customer loyalty, IP, and competitive advan-
tage. If all companies were required to disclose
broad categories of expenditures on intangibles
(more comprehensively than the narrow R&D se-
ries), this might level the playing field and allevi-
ate the risk of unilateral information spillovers.
Financial accounting is only one source of infor-
mation about intangibles. This paper highlights a
range of other non-financial sources of informa-
tion that are value-relevant. This evidence is con-
sistent with Whisenant (1998), who provides
evidence that value-relevance is not solely a func-
tion of GAAP. Instead, investors use financial
statement analysis techniques and recognised data
in the annual report, including the notes to the ac-
counts, to adjust the financial statement informa-
tion before using it in their valuation models.
Investors do not expect financial information to
stand alone. A question for future research is to
what extent the gaps in the financial reporting on
intangibles are already addressed by non-financial
sources of information.
Finally, an implication of the evidence reviewed
in this paper is that accounting regulators might
better facilitate value-relevant disclosures on in-
tangibles if they give discretion to management to
report their firm’s economic reality (as in the
Australian experience). To be interpretable, ac-
counting standards are needed as guidance for
managers. To be relevant, the standards need to be
benchmarked to the economics of the intangible
investments so that compliance means the firms
report in accordance with their firm’s economics
(e.g. the technical feasibility test in SFAS No. 86
Accounting for the Costs of Computer Software 
to Be Sold, Leased, or Otherwise Marketed).
Research that identifies which of the firms’ expen-
ditures create value, and how, is important for as-
sisting regulators to promulgate economically
relevant accounting standards.
Regulators can efficiently oversee the exercise
of management’s financial reporting discretion
using an electronic financial reporting surveil-
lance. An example of a reportedly effective system
suggested by Bayley and Taylor (2007) uses fairly
simple financial statement analysis techniques that
pinpoint firms engaged in the management of
GAAP financial statements outside an acceptable
bound.
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